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Abstract
We empirically investigate the welfare of intermediaries in oligopolistic markets, where
intermediaries offer additional services. We exploit the unique circumstance that, in our
empirical setting, consumers can purchase from manufacturers or intermediaries. We
specify an equilibrium model, and estimate it using product-level data. The demand
includes consumers with costly search and channel-specific preferences. The supply
includes two distribution channels. One features bargaining about wholesale prices
between manufacturers and intermediaries, and price competition among intermediaries.
The other is vertically integrated. The model is used to simulate counterfactuals, where
intermediaries do not offer additional services. We find that intermediaries increase
welfare.
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1 Introduction
Intermediaries play an important role in contemporary economies. For example, in the U.S.
they represent over a third of the value added to the economy.1 They provide a wide variety
of services to the consumers. Intermediaries often add value by transforming products (e.g.
adding transportation, packaging, or assembling services), or by providing information and
consulting services about the characteristics of the products sold by the manufacturers (Spul-
ber 1996). Intermediaries also improve welfare to consumers by reducing search frictions, thus
improving the coordination of the actions of consumers and manufacturers (Rubinstein and
Wolinsky 1987). When negotiating with a manufacturer, intermediaries centralize transac-
tions of multiple consumers, thus supplanting consumers’ decentralized bargaining with the
manufacturer (Spulber 1996). The resulting increase in intermediaries’ bargaining power,
translates in lower marginal costs for the intermediaries, which results in lower prices to the
consumers. In the absence of market power, intermediaries improve consumers’ welfare when
they provide these additional services (see Spulber 1999 for a thorough analysis). However,
as noted in the seminal article by Salinger (1988), when market power is present intermedi-
aries may also lead to double marginalization, whereby the product is marked up above the
marginal cost of production twice, once by the manufacturer and once again by the interme-
diary.2 In such a cases, intermediaries may reduce welfare. A natural question arises: What
are the welfare implications of intermediaries in oligopolistic markets where intermediaries
offer additional services to differentiate their products from the ones of the manufacturers?
There is a vast literature studying the role of intermediaries in different markets.3 Two
major explanations why intermediaries arise are to facilitate matching of buyers and sellers,
and to guarantee quality. There is also a large empirical literature studying specific roles of
intermediaries in many markets, such as online markets, two-sided platforms, financial mar-
kets, banking, asset pricing, labor markets, agrifood chains, and facilitating trade. However,
there has been little empirical work to address the central question of what are the overall
welfare implications of intermediaries in the industry when intermediaries offer simultane-
ously consulting, search, and purchase aggregation services to differentiate their products
1U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2017). The estimate corresponds to the year 2016 using the definition
by Spulber (1996) in table 1, whereby intermediation includes retail trade (5.9 percent of GDP for the year
2016), wholesale trade (5.9 percent), finance and insurance (7.3 percent), business services (12.4 percent),
and other services (2.3 percent). This estimate assumes that intermediation activities in all other sectors are
zero, so it is a conservative estimate (see Spulber 1996).
2This is the well known result when there are successive monopolies at two layers of production, and
goes back to Lerner (1934) (for further references see, e.g., Spengler 1950 and Tirole 1988, pp. 174-6; see
Luco and Marshall 2018 for a recent investigation on vertical integration with multiproduct firms). When
the manufacturer and intermediary layers are both oligopolistic, and vertically integrated and unintegrated
manufacturers coexist, the presence of intermediaries may increase or decrease the price of the final good (see
Salinger 1988 for details). With consumer search the double marginalization problem is worsened, resulting
in higher wholesale and retail prices due manufacturer’s demand being more inelastic (Janssen and Shelegia
2015).
3See Spulber (1999) for a survey. See next subsection for the related literature.
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from the ones of the manufacturers. Yet, ignoring these additional services has significant
consequences on the theoretical and empirical predictions for the determination of prices and
consumer choices in these markets.
In this paper, we provide empirical estimates of the welfare of intermediation in vertical
markets when intermediaries simultaneously provide consulting, search, and purchase aggre-
gation services as defined in the model below. There are two major challenges to identifying
the value of intermediaries in such cases. The first challenge arises due the non existence
of a counterfactual scenario without intermediaries in industries where intermediaries are
present.4 This precludes evaluating the performance of the market without intermediaries.
The second challenge arises due to the difficulty of observing all the transactions between
manufacturers, intermediaries, and consumers in the industry. This may introduce a selec-
tion problem when evaluating the behavior of the unobserved participants, in addition to the
previous complication. In both cases, recovering consumer demand preferences and supply
marginal costs requires strong assumptions about market participants.
To address these issues we collected a novel dataset with all meaningful transactions
among manufacturers and intermediaries in the Portuguese outdoor advertising industry for
the year 2013. This allows us to exploit two unique features of the industry that allow us to
quantify the welfare effects of intermediaries in this industry. First, there are two distribution
channels in the outdoor advertising industry: consumers can purchase the product either
directly from manufacturers, or through intermediaries. This helps us overcome the first
challenge mentioned above, by comparing instances where the same combination of display
format and manufacturer is sold in both distribution channels. We then use the model
described below to compute the counterfactual value that the consumer would have obtained
had the purchase been made in a distribution channel different from the one actually observed.
Second, we collected market level data directly from all the meaningful manufactures and
intermediaries in the industry, which encompass more than 95 percent of the volume of
transactions in the industry. This helps us overcome the second challenge mentioned above.
To quantify the value of intermediation we develop an econometric model of the indus-
try. The model features two distribution channels where consumers can buy advertising: the
direct sales channel (DSC), where consumers purchase directly from the manufacturers; and
the vertical sales channel (VSC), where consumers purchase using the intermediaries. On the
demand side, consumers have preferences that are specific to each distribution channel and
engage in costly search. To model demand we use a random coefficient nested logit model
with costly search, as described in subsection 3.1. On the supply side, the industry consists
of two vertical layers modeled using a two stage game, as described in subsection 3.2. In the
top layer, the manufacturers produce display formats for the display of outdoor advertising
(manufacture products) that they sell to the intermediaries at wholesale prices. Manufactur-
4Alternatively, the counterfactual scenario with intermediaries is unobserved in industries where interme-
diaries are not present.
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ers and intermediaries bargain over wholesale prices through Nash bargaining. This is the
manufacture game. In the second layer, manufacturers and intermediaries sell the display
formats (final products) to the consumers, competing on prices. This is the retail game. The
distribution channels are represented by two types of retailers: DSC and VSC retailers. The
DSC retailers are the manufacturers who sell final products to the consumers charging DSC
prices. The VSC retailers are the intermediaries who charge VSC prices to the consumers.
We use the terms “intermediaries,” “retailers,” and “VSC retailers” interchangeably.
We estimate the model in two steps. First, we estimate the parameters that characterize
demand without using the supply side model. To identify the price coefficient and the
heterogeneity parameters we rely on standard instruments with the exclusion restrictions
discussed in subsection 4.1. To identify the search costs parameters, we construct additional
micro moments using Google search data, as discussed in appendix D. Then, we estimate the
parameters that characterize supply (retail and manufacture marginal costs, and bargaining
weights) conditional on the demand estimates from the first step. To identify the supply side
parameters we use the equilibrium conditions from the model, and additional restrictions
using the vertical structure in our empirical setting. We use the first order conditions from
manufacture and retail games, and assume that the manufacture marginal costs are the same
for display formats—the physical products in this industry—sold to VSC retailers and to
consumers as discussed in subsection 4.2.
Our strategy to estimate the welfare implications of intermediaries consists of comparing
circumstances where the same combination of display format and manufacturer is sold by
DSC and VSC retailers, and using the model to estimate the value to consumers of each
of the additional services provided by the VSC retailers. The VSC retailers provide three
additional services to the consumers, and charge a margin for them. The additional ser-
vices are: (i) search services, whereby VSC retailers provide information to consumers about
display formats from multiple manufacturers, thus decreasing consumers’ search costs; (ii)
purchase aggregation services, whereby consumers benefit from quantity discounts that VSC
retailers obtain because they aggregate purchases from multiple consumers; and (iii) consult-
ing services, defined as the residual gross utility of buying from VSC retailers relative to a
DSC retailer.5 The market structures in the vertical layers determine the prices and margins
charged by the manufacturers and retailers.
We use the estimated equilibrium model to simulate four counterfactual scenarios to
quantify the value of intermediaries. First, we simulate the equilibrium of an industry where
retailers do not offer consulting services. Second, we simulate the equilibrium of an industry
where retailers do not offer search services. Third, we simulate the equilibrium of an industry
where retailers do not offer purchase aggregation services. Finally, we remove simultaneously
the three types of services to evaluate the total impact on welfare due to the intermediaries.
In the latter we find that the presence of intermediaries increases welfare because the value
5See subsection 6.2 for the definition of these services in terms of the model.
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of their services outweighs the additional margin charged. We find that purchase aggregation
and search services are the most important mechanisms for such welfare enhancement.
In summary, we make three main contributions. First, we combine a novel data set
with a new econometric equilibrium model to estimate consumer demand preferences and
marginal costs in the presence of intermediation, consumers’ costly search, and bargaining
between manufactures and intermediaries. The data includes all meaningful transactions in
an industry where consumers can choose whether to use intermediaries. The model includes
consumers who have preferences that are specific to each distribution channel and engage in
costly search on the demand side; and two layers of activity with two distribution channels
on the supply side. Second, we quantify the value of intermediaries in oligopolistic markets
where intermediaries offer these additional services to differentiate their products from the
ones of the manufacturers. Finally, from a normative perspective, our estimates show that
the presence of intermediaries in the outdoor advertising industry is welfare improving be-
cause the benefits to consumers from the additional services provided by the intermediaries
outweighs the additional margin charged by the intermediaries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the industry, the data,
and presents stylized facts about the industry. Section 3 presents the equilibrium model. Sec-
tion 4 discusses identification and estimation of the demand and supply. Section 5 presents
the estimation results. The welfare analysis is performed in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Robustness analysis, extensions, and details about the data and the model are in the ap-
pendix.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature that studies intermediaries. In an early study, Zili-
botti (1994) investigates the relationship between growth and intermediation, emphasizing
the role of market imperfections on economic development. Spulber (1999) presents a compre-
hensive study of intermediation, including how intermediaries alleviate problems associated
with search costs and a detailed discussion of additional services provided by intermediaries.
The role of firms as intermediaries has been studied extensively. Some papers include, e.g.,
Yanelle (1989), Gehrig (1993), Rust and Hall (2003), Hagiu and Jullien (2011), Wright and
Wong (2014), and Edelman and Wright (2015). Some explanations why intermediaries arise
are to facilitate matching of buyers and sellers as in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), to
guarantee quality as in Biglaiser (1993) and Spulber (1996), and recently as rent extraction
(Farboodi, Jarosch, and Menzio 2017). Our case is closest to that in Rubinstein and Wolin-
sky (1987) and Spulber (1995, 1999) in that intermediaries create value by reducing search
costs, and by providing additional services to the consumers.
The role of intermediaries has been studied a many markets. There is a large literature
studying the role of intermediaries in online markets (e.g. Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000;
Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso 2001; Brown and Goolsbee 2002; Brynjolfsson, Hu, and
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Smith 2003; Baye, Morgan, and Scholten 2003; Ellison and Ellison 2009; Quan and Williams
2016),6 and in financial markets, banking, and asset pricing (e.g. James 1987, Diamond
1984, He and Krishnamurthy 2013; Brunnermeier and Sannikov 2014; Gavazza 2016; Robles-
Garcia 2018).7 Intermediation also plays an important role in labor markets (e.g. Stanton
and Thomas 2016), agrifood chains (e.g. Lee, Gereffi, and Beauvais 2012), facilitating trade
(e.g. Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei 2011), and certifying information in markets with adverse
selection (e.g. Biglaiser 1993; Lizzeri 1999; Biglaiser, Li, Murry, and Zhou 2017). Relative
to these papers, our contribution is to estimate the welfare implications due to the presence
of intermediaries in the industry, accounting for the change in the market structure created
by the presence of the intermediaries, and the three additional services that intermediaries
offer to consumers which differentiates their products from the ones of the manufacturers.
The literature studying outdoor advertising is nonexistent. The only paper that we are
aware is Pereira and Ribeiro (2018); they study capacity divestitures in this industry, not
intermediation.
Our demand model in subsection 3.1 is related to the literature that uses models of
discrete choice between differentiated products with costly search.8 Our demand model is
closest to De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and Wildenbeest (2012), Honka (2014), and Moraga-
González, Sándor, and Wildenbeest (2015), who develop discrete choice models of demand
in which consumers engage in costly search with fixed sample size.9 None of these papers
consider preferences specific to the distribution channel, which is the main focus this paper.10
We incorporate these preferences using the distribution assumptions of the nested logit (e.g.
Berry 1994; Cardell 1997), that we embed into a random coefficient discrete choice demand
model with costly search.11 For the estimation of the demand, we use an adapted version
of the procedure proposed by Moraga-González, Sándor, and Wildenbeest (2015). This
procedure adapts the nested fixed algorithm used by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)
to account for the additional term in the choice probability that the preferences for the
distribution channel introduce, which modifies the computation of the market share function
from the estimation algorithm (see subsection 4.1 for details).
6Some references in the growing literature on two-sided platforms as intermediaries include, e.g., Bernard
and Jullien (2003), Evans (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003), Armstrong (2006), Galeotti and Moraga-González
(2009), Boik (2016).
7See O’Hara (1995), Freixas and Rochet (2008), and Frankel, Galli, and Giovannini (2009) for surveys.
8For studies of the formation of consideration sets with fixed sample search see, e.g., Roberts and Lattin
(1991) and Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan (2003) in the marketing literature.
9See also Goeree (2008), Salz (2017), Fréchette, Lizzeri, and Salz (2018), and Ershov (2018).
10The information structure is also different in our model relative to these papers. In our model consumers
face uncertainty over both the price and the realization of the random shock of each product (similar to Pires
2016), while in De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and Wildenbeest (2012) consumers only face uncertainty about the
price of the product (not about the realization of the random shock), and in Moraga-González, Sándor, and
Wildenbeest (2015) consumers only face uncertainty about the realization of the random shock (not about
the price of the product). See subsubsection 3.1.3 for details.
11For other recent applications of the random coefficient nested logit model see, e.g., Grennan (2013),
Ciliberto and Williams (2014), Conlon and Rao (2015), and Miller and Weinberg (2017). None of these
papers incorporate costly search.
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On the supply side, our model in subsection 3.2 is related to the literature that models
the vertical relations between manufacturers and intermediaries/retailers. Our model fea-
tures two layers of activity (manufacturers and VSC retailers), and two distribution channels
where consumers can purchase (VSC and DSC retailers). The two layers of activity are
related vertically as in, e.g., Brenkers and Verboven (2006), Mortimer (2008), Bonnet and
Dubois (2010), Villas-Boas (2007), and Dubois and Sæthre (2016). The main difference be-
tween these papers and ours, is that in our model manufacturers and VSC retailers bargain
over wholesale prices through Nash bargaining.12 Our bargaining model is standard and sim-
ilar to, e.g., Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas (2010),
Grennan (2013), Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town (2015), Ho and Lee (2017), Crawford, Lee,
Whinston, and Yurukoglu (2018), Noton and Elberg (2018).13 The main difference between
the bargaining models in these papers and ours, is that in our model the retailers in both
distribution channels can sell their products to the consumers. This occurs in our model after
the bargaining process, where prices are set to consumers through standard Bertrand com-
petition. Thus, the instruments and identifying assumptions to recover equilibrium margins
as a function of the demand primitives, and bargaining power of VSC retailers and manu-
facturers are different (see subsection 4.2 for details). Similar to Grennan (2013) we do not
estimate all bargaining and cost parameters because we do not have enough information (see
subsection 4.2 for details).
2 Portuguese Outdoor Advertising Industry
In this section, we describe: (i) the Portuguese outdoor advertising industry, (ii) the data
set, and (iii) three stylized facts about the industry.
2.1 Industry Overview
In this subsection, we give an overview of the Portuguese outdoor advertising industry.
12Nash bargaining is a way to generate quantity discounts (or nonlinear pricing schemes). In a Nash
bargaining model, the larger the value of the bargaining parameter and the larger the value of the outside
option, the better the terms a party can negotiate. In our setting, when negotiating with a VSC retailer,
the outside option of a manufacturer is the profit if its products are not sold by the VSC retailer. So for
a given manufacturer, the “larger” is the VSC retailer it is negotiating with, the smaller is the value of its
outside option, and the smaller is the wholesale price it is willing to charge the VSC retailer. Note that there
there are no volumes/quantities explicitly involved in our bargaining game. However, the volumes/quantities
define how large is the VSC retailer and, thus, determine its outside option in the Nash bargaining game.
Thus, the bargaining model does not generates quantity discounts per se. Rather, it rationalizes the observed
quantity discounts in the setting, through larger estimated outside options for larger VSC retailers. The
quantity discounts between manufacturers and VSC retailers are then partially transferred to the consumers
by the VSC retailers. There is a large literature studying quantity discounts and nonlinear pricing (see,
e.g., Miravete 2002; Busse and Rysman 2005; McManus 2007; Cohen 2008; Chu, Leslie, and Sorensen 2011;
Miravete and Röller 2004a; Miravete and Röller 2004b; Nevo, Turner, and Williams 2016; Donna and Pires
2016).
13Craig, Grennan, and Swanson (2018) estimate marginal cost efficiencies due to horizontal mergers using
detailed data for a large sample of U.S. hospitals.
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Agents. There are three main economic agents in the Portuguese outdoor advertising in-
dustry: (i) manufacturers, (ii) retailers, and (iii) consumers. A manufacturer, also called
media owner, is a firm that installs and commercially exploits equipment for the display of
outdoor advertising; examples include J.C. Decaux Group, Cemusa, Mop, etc. A retailer,
also called media group, is an intermediary that buys advertising from the manufacturer on
behalf of the consumer; examples include Omnicom Media Group, WPP Plc., Power Media
Group Inc., etc. Retailers also offer consumers additional services such as consulting services,
advertising planning campaigns, and information about the products of several manufactur-
ers.14 Geographically, all manufacturers and retailers operate in the same market. This
follows from Portugal being a small country, where the population is concentrated along
the coast. Finally, a consumer, also called advertiser, is a firm that demands advertising to
promote its products. So consumers in this industry are firms that buy “exposure” in the
manufacturer advertisement network.15 For example, consumers buy 200 faces16 distributed
in the national network of J.C. Decaux Group, but they cannot choose specific 2 m2 panels
located at a particular place. Most of the purchases are in the national network, which is the
focus of this paper. The exposition is similar across manufacturers.17
Vertical Relations. Consumers make 85 percent of their purchases from the retailers and
the remaining 15 percent directly from the manufacturers (table 1 discussed in subsection
2.2). Thus, in this industry there are two active distribution channels: (i) the Vertical
Structure Channel (VSC), whereby consumers purchase manufacturers’ products through
the intermediation of retailers; and (ii) the Direct Sales Channel (DSC), whereby consumers
purchase manufacturers’ products directly from the manufacturers. We refer to the retailers
in the VSC as “VSC retailers” and to the manufacturers that sell directly to the consumers in
the DSC as “DSC retailers.” Similarly, we refer to the price charged to the consumers by the
VSC retailers (DSC retailers) as “VSC price” (“DSC price”).18 Figure 1 displays the vertical
relations in the Portuguese outdoor advertising industry.
Retailers’ Services. Retailers provide three main services to the consumers in this indus-
try. First, they provide consulting services similar to Spulber (1996, 1999). Retailers assist
consumers with their advertisement campaigns by helping them to make decisions such as
the type and number of display formats to buy (i.e. type and total number of panels), and
the duration of the advertising campaign.
Second, retailers provide purchase aggregation services to the consumers. Retailers ag-
14A retailer is set of media agencies and a central purchasing agency with a common owner. Media agencies
plan and buy advertising campaigns. The central purchasing agency aggregates purchases of media agencies
and places orders to the manufacturers. A retailer might own several media agencies either because they
specialize in different industries or to avoid confidentiality issues with advertisers.
15The advertisement network refers to the location of the different display formats available from each of
the manufacturers
16E.g. 200 panels of 2 m2, which is the most popular display format as explained below.
17As explained below, we observe the manufacturers’ capacity.
18The VSC price is typically referred to as retail price in other industries.
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gregate the purchases from multiple consumers when buying from the manufacturers. This
gives retailers larger bargaining power to negotiate with the manufacturers, enabling them
to obtain lower prices per unit relative to the consumers (i.e. “quantity discounts” as de-
fined in subsubsection 2.3.1). These discounts are partially transferred to the consumers
(subsubsection 2.3.1).
Finally, retailers provide search services to the consumers. When a consumer contacts a
retailer, the retailer can provide information about the prices available for the products of
multiple manufacturers in the industry. Retailers collect this information once per period
(e.g. month) and use it for the orders of multiple consumers. This allows retailers to benefit
from economies of scale relative to the consumers (we document this in subsubsection 2.3.3).
In addition retailers have more experience than consumers collecting this information from
the manufacturers, which allows them to do it more efficiently (i.e. lower search costs due
to better search technology).
Display Formats. There are three main display formats: (i) 2 m2 panels,19 (ii) Seniores,
and (iii) Others. Panels of 2 m2 include city information panels, bus shelters, kiosks, etc.
A Senior is an advertising panel with an area between 8 and 24 m2. The last category,
“others,” encompasses Transports and Special Formats. A Transport includes panels on
moving vehicles (e.g. buses, trains, taxis, etc.) or transport hubs (e.g. airports, railway’s
stations, subways’ stations, etc.). Finally, a Special Format is large panel typically made
by special request to be displayed, e.g., on buildings’ gables. We define a product as a
combination of display format, manufacturer, and retailer (see subsection 2.2).
Payment Schedules. Contracts and payment schedules between manufacturers and VSC
retailers are negotiated because all participants in the industry are firms. Manufacturers
charge a price schedule that consists of a linear price and quantity discounts as function of
the total sales. Consumers’ purchases in the DSC exhibit no quantity discounts (see table
4 described in subsubsection 2.3.1). However, when consumers purchase in the VSC, these
quantity discounts (that the VSC retailers obtain from the manufacturers) are partially trans-
ferred to the consumers. Payment schedules between (VSC or DSC) retailers and consumers
are posted prices from the consumers’ perspective (Pereira and Ribeiro 2018).
Productive Capacity. In the short run the productive capacity of each manufacturer and,
thus, of the industry is fixed. The capacity is measured by the installed display equipment
available for outdoor advertising. To operate, manufacturers must first obtain the right to
use the space where the display equipment is installed, either through a public tender or
direct contracting. This right is obtained from the “site owners,” which are the landlords
of the physical space where the display equipment is installed. Site owners include transit
authorities, airports, supermarkets, malls, and other private landlords. The rights between
the manufacturers and the site owners are set by long term contracts that last up to 20
19 Also referred as “mupis” in the industry of Romance countries.
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years. In this paper we focus on the year 2013, so the productive capacity is fixed. Moreover,
the inspection of our data on manufacturers’ installed capacity and monthly usage indicates
that capacity limits are never attained in our sample for any of the manufacturers. So
manufacturers always operate below capacity.
Market Concentration. The Portuguese outdoor advertising market is quite concen-
trated both at the manufacture and retail levels. At the manufacture level there are three
large national firms that are responsible of 77.6 percent of the sales in the market. At the
retail level the five largest VSC retailers are responsible of 48.2 percent of the sales. See
appendix B.1 for details.
2.2 Data
The Data Set. The data were obtained from various sources. We obtained administrative
data from all the meaningful manufactures and retailers in the industry for the year 2013
aggregated at the monthly market level. By meaningful we mean that our data encompass
more than 95 percent of the volume of transactions in the industry. A product is a com-
bination of display format, manufacturer, and retailer. We consider 3 display formats:20 2
m2 panel, senior, and an additional category aggregating the remaining formats that have
negligible weight individually.21 We consider 4 manufacturers: the 3 main manufacturers in
the industry (J.C. Decaux Group, Cemusa, and Mop) and an additional manufacturer that
aggregates the smaller manufacturers. Finally we consider 9 retailers: the 5 main VSC re-
tailers in the industry (Omnicom Media Group, WPP Plc., Power Media Group Inc., Havas
Media Group, and Interpublic Group of Companies), 1 additional VSC retailer that aggre-
gates the smaller VSC retailers, and 3 DSC retailers representing the direct sales of each of
the 3 larger manufacturers (J.C. Decaux Group, Cemusa, and Mop).22 Examples of products
are: J.C. Decaux Group’s 2 m2 panels sold by Havas Media Group, Cemusa’s seniors sold
by WPP Plc., and J.C. Decaux Group’s 2 m2 panels sold directly by J.C. Decaux Group.
Henceforth, and for confidentiality reasons, we refer to the 3 main manufacturers as m1, m2,
and m3, not necessarily in the order above, to the additional manufacturer as m4, to the
retailers in the DSC as rd1, rd2, rd3, by the same order as the 3 main manufacturers, to the 5
main VSC retailers as rv4 , . . . , rv8 , not necessarily in the order above, and to the additional
VSC retailer as rv9 . Figure 1 summarizes this information. See appendix A.1 for details about
the procedures to clean the data.
Characteristics of the manufacturers and retailers were collected by inspecting the web-
sites of the retailers and manufacturers. Google search data—used to construct micro moment
conditions to identify the search costs parameters on the demand side—were obtained from
Google Trends Portugal. See appendix A.2 for details.
In each month and for each triplet of display format, manufacturer, and retailer we
20See previous subsection for a description of display formats.
21This category includes special and transport formats.
22There are not direct sales through the other manufacturers.
9
observe: the total sales, measured in Euros; the total quantity of advertising sold, measured
in advertising faces and square meters; the wholesale prices charged from the manufacturers
to the retailers, measured in Euros; the commissions, fees, and quantity discounts paid to the
manufacturers, measured in Euros; and the installed capacity, measured in advertising faces.23
We also observe characteristics for each manufacturer and retailer, such as the number of
offices.
Products. We define a product as a combination of display format, manufacturer, and
retailer (including DSC and VSC retailers). Panel A in table 1 shows the percentage of
sales to consumers by each combination of manufacturer-retailer in the sample. Panel B in
table 1 shows the percentage of sales of each of the 57 inside products in the sample. Note
that the total number of inside products in the sample, 57, is lower than the total possible
products in the market, 81.24 This is because: (i) some VSC retailers only sell a subset of
display formats from certain manufacturers, the subset with which they contracted,25 and
(ii) some DSC retailers do not sell certain display formats directly to consumers.26 Note that
all of the VSC retailers contract with all of the three largest manufacturers. This rules out
the possibility that some retailers do not negotiate with some of the manufacturers due to
selection based on unobservables.
Wholesale and Retail Prices in the VSC. Table 2 reports summary statistics on whole-
sale and VSC prices for each display format (see figure 1 for definitions of the prices charged
by each agent). VSC prices, i.e. retail prices, are higher than wholesale prices, as expected.
Panel B shows large differences in prices across both manufacturers and retailers holding
constant the display format. These price differences and the differences in the observed mar-
ket shares suggest that differentiation is important. Table A1 in the appendix compares
wholesale and retail prices in the VSC by manufacturer and by retailer for the display for-
mat 2 m2 panel. There are substantial differences in VSC and wholesale prices across VSC
retailers holding constant the display format and the manufacturer. For example, retailer rv9
is the most expensive retailer, including DSC retailer, for 2 m2 panels manufactured by m2,
but the cheapest retailer for seniors manufactured by m2. Tables 2 and A1 also show that
differences in wholesale and VSC prices are small. This suggest that most of the differences
in VSC prices are explained by differences in wholesale prices and that profits margins of
VSC retailers are small.
23From the manufacturers we collected the data from the first week of each month.
24The total possible number of products to the consumers in the market is (see table 1):
(3 Display Formats)× (4 Manufacturers)× (6 VSC Retailers)︸ ︷︷ ︸
VSC
+ (3 Display Formats)× (3 DSC Retailers)︸ ︷︷ ︸
DSC
= 81.
25E.g. Panel B in table 1 shows that retailer rv8 does not sell 2 m2 panels manufactured by m3.
26E.g. Panel B in table 1 shows that retailer rd1 , which corresponds to manufacturer m1 selling directly to
consumers, does not sell seniors in the DSC.
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Sales to Consumers in the VSC and DSC. Panel A in table 1 shows that 85.2 percent
of the sales to consumers are made through VSC retailers and the remaining 14.8 percent
are made through DSC retailers. There is substantial variation across months in the market
shares of VSC and DSC sales (see figure A1 that is described in appendix B.2). Monthly sales
in the DSC range between 13.9 and 42.6 percent (figure A1). DSC prices are higher than
wholesale prices holding constant the manufacturer and the display format. This is because
manufacturers offer quantity discounts to retailers; it may also suggest that manufacturers
use direct sales as a price discrimination mechanism (in the DSC).
Table 3 shows that the median price paid by consumers is typically higher in the DSC
than in the VSC. But occasionally prices in the DSC are lower than in the VSC (e.g. senior
manufactured by m1 in Panel B in table 3). This is the result of two effects. On the one hand
VSC retailers aggregate the purchases of several consumers, allowing them to obtain lower
prices per unit (due the quantity discounts) when negotiating with the manufacturers (see
subsection 2.3). This lowers VSC prices and increases VSC price dispersion (higher standard
deviation) relative to the DSC prices.27 On the other hand VSC retailers offer additional
services to the consumers (e.g. consulting services, advertising planning campaigns, infor-
mation about the products of all manufacturers, etc.) that are not offered by DSC retailers.
This increases VSC prices relative DSC, because VSC retailers charge for these additional
services.
Market Shares. We use the data described above to build a data set of products (defined
as a combination of display format, manufacturer, and retailer) sold in the DSC and VSC for
each month of the year 2013 and their characteristics. Market shares are defined by dividing
volume sales by the total potential sales in a given month (i.e. market size). This potential
sales (or market size) was assumed to be twenty percent greater than the maximum observed
total monthly sales of the year 2013. The market share of the outside good was defined as the
difference between one, and the sum of the market shares of the inside goods in each month.
The outside good can be conceptualized as including products outside the sample (e.g. special
request panels), outdoor advertising sold by other manufacturers and retailers (e.g. small
manufacturers and retailers that operate locally), and not buying outdoor advertising. An
observation in this data set represents a market share of a product as defined above in a
given month. We consider 12 markets, one for each month of the year, and a continuum of
heterogeneous consumers in each market.
2.3 Three Stylized Facts
In this subsection we present descriptive patterns from the data. The Portuguese outdoor
advertising industry is characterized by: (i) quantity discounts in the VSC, (ii) seasonal effects
and large variation in the market shares, and (iii) substantial price dispersion conditional on
27Note, however, that conditional on quantity discounts, the distribution of prices in the VSC is less disperse
than in the DSC, as discussed on page 12.
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quantity discounts and seasonal effects. In the next section we use the patterns presented
here to construct the structural model.
2.3.1 Quantity Discounts in the VSC
Consumers’ purchases exhibit quantity discounts in the VSC, but not in the DSC. By quantity
discounts we mean that the price paid per square meter decreases with the volume purchased.
Table 4 presents evidence about quantity discounts. It displays OLS regressions of the price
paid by consumers per square meter of advertising on the total volume of advertising in a log-
arithmic scale, denoted by “Log(m2).” Column 1 shows that the price paid by consumers per
square meter of advertising decreases nonlinearly with the volume purchased of advertising.
In column 2 we include an interaction between “Log(m2)” and “VSC.” The variable “VSC”
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the consumer performed the purchase through a VSC
retailer, and 0 if the consumer performed the purchase through a DSC retailer. The interac-
tion term is negative and statistically different from zero, while the coefficient on “Log(m2)”
is no longer statistically different from zero. This means that the purchases made by con-
sumers in the VSC exhibit quantity discounts, and the ones made in the DSC not. Columns
3 and 4 show similar results when we include fixed effects for manufacturers, retailers, display
formats, and months. Columns 2 and 4 show that the effect of quantity discounts is only
present for the purchases made in the VSC.28
The presence of quantity discounts only in the VSC arises because the retailers aggregate
the purchases from multiple consumers when buying from the manufacturers. This results
in quantity discounts on the wholesale prices of the products bought by the VSC retailers
from the manufacturers. The resulting quantity discounts are then partially transferred to
the consumers by the VSC retailers. Although consumers could negotiate directly with the
manufacturer (i.e. DSC retailer), the individual quantity purchased by a given consumer is
substantially lower than the total quantity purchased by the VSC retailers (because retailers
aggregate the volume purchased by many consumers). So the purchases made by consumers
in the DSC exhibit no quantity discounts.
2.3.2 Seasonalities and Monthly Variation
The Portuguese advertising industry is also characterized by seasonal variations. The total
volume purchased in the Portuguese advertising industry increases during the summer. For
the estimation, we use monthly indicator variables to account for these seasonal effects. See
appendix B.2 for details.
2.3.3 Price Dispersion and Returns to Consumer Search
The Portuguese outdoor advertising industry is characterized by substantial price dispersion:
(i) across retailers holding constant the display format (product heterogeneity), the month
of the year (seasonal effects), and the volume percentile (quantity discounts); and (ii) across
28We obtain similar results by regressing the price paid by consumers per square meter of advertising on
a polynomial of the amount of square meters of advertising purchased. Results are available upon request.
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months holding constant the display format, the manufacturer, the retailer, and the volume
percentile. This indicates that the returns to consumers’ search (for product’s prices) are
high in this market.29
Price dispersion is lower in the VSC than in the DSC conditional on quantity dis-
counts (figures 2 and A2). The top panel in figure 2 displays the distribution of the co-
efficient of variation of prices (CV) holding constant the display format, the month, and
the volume percentile (i.e. each CV is computed within the unit of analysis in the tuple
(Display Format,Month,Volume Percentile)).30 The mean CV (pooling together sales in the
VSC and DSC) is 45 percent. The mean CV for sales made in the VSC is 43 percent and for
sales made in the DSC is 54 percent.31 This indicates that returns to consumers’ search (for
product’s prices) vary substantially by distribution channel.32
The bottom panel in figure 2 shows that the empirical CDF for sales made in the DSC
first order stochastically dominates the one for sales made in the VSC. This indicates that
consumers who buy in the VSC face lower price dispersion consistently. Buying in the VSC
can provide substantial returns to consumers with large search costs in this market. Figure 2
is consistent with VSC retailers providing search services to the consumers (subsection 2.1).
Finally, we note that the observables and fixed effects included in the structural model,
explain a large proportion, 82.8 percent, of the documented price dispersion. The latter num-
ber refers to the R2 of regressing the CVs in figure 2 on observables and fixed effects (which
include months, products, manufacturers, retailers, and volume percentile fixed effects).
29In principle, one can also measure the variation in prices across identical goods sold by the same retailer
holding constant the manufacturer, the month of the year (seasonal effects), and the volume percentile
(quantity discounts). However, we cannot hold constant both, the retailer-manufacturer and the month of
the year, due to the nature of our data (i.e. we do not observe the individual transactions of the consumers,
only the total transactions per month per product and per retailer-manufacturer). Figure 2 measures price
dispersion across retailers holding constant the display format, the month of the year, and the volume
percentile (quantity discounts). Figure A2 in the appendix measures price dispersion across months holding
constant the display format, the manufacturer, the retailer, and the volume percentile. Similar results are
obtained. In the rest of this subsection we focus on figure 2 for consistency with the structural model in next
section. See also footnote 32.
30We obtain similar results using other measures of price dispersion such as percentile differences (e.g.
difference between the 95th and the 5th price percentiles, difference between the 90th and the 10th price
percentiles, etc.), range, and price gap. Results are available upon request.
31Note that substantial price variation is explained by quantity discounts, as emphasized in subsubsection
2.3.1. Ignoring quantity discounts one would incorrectly conclude that the price distribution is more disperse
for sales made in the VSC than for sales made in the DSC (bottom panel in figure A1).
32As emphasized in subsection 2.1, VSC retailers also offer additional services to consumers (e.g. consulting
services, advertising planning campaigns, information about the products of all manufacturers, etc.) that
are not offered by DSC retailers. Figure A2 in the appendix shows similar patterns to the ones in figure
2 when we measure price dispersion across months holding constant the display format, the manufacturer,
the retailer, and the volume percentile (i.e. identical products sold by the same seller holding constant the
volume percentile). Thus the additional services provided by the VSC retailers in this industry shift the
distribution of prices charged by each VSC retailer, but do not affect price dispersion in the market.
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3 Model
3.1 Consumers
3.1.1 Set Up
To model demand we use a random coefficient nested logit model with costly search. Con-
sumers know the products available in each market, but do not know the price or the realiza-
tion of the random shock associated with each product. To learn this information consumers
engage in costly search for retailers.
Consumer’s choice is a two step process. In the first step the consumer chooses the subset
of retailers to search. After searching for a retailer, the consumer learns the information
(prices and the realization of the random shocks) of the products sold by that retailer. This
determines the choice set, or consideration set, for each consumer type. The consideration set
is given by the subset of products sold by all the retailers searched and the outside product,
as described below. In the second step, after observing the prices and random shocks of the
products sold by the retailers searched, the consumer chooses the product to purchase (i.e.
the consumer chooses among the subset of products from the retailers searched). This is a
standard discrete choice problem (e.g. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995), where the only
difference is that the choice set for each consumer is endogenously determined in the first
step. We refer to the first step as the “search step” and to the second step as the “purchase
step.” Below we describe each step starting with purchase step.
Assume that there are t = 1, . . . , T markets, each with i = 1, . . . , It types of rational,
utility-maximizing consumers. Consumers have different preferences for different products.
A market is defined as a month. In each market t, there are Jt horizontally differentiated
and mutually exclusive inside products, indexed by j = 1, . . . , Jt. We index with j = 0 the
outside product that allows consumers not to purchase any of the inside products. In each
market, each consumer purchases one inside product or the outside product.
3.1.2 Step 2: Purchase step
Consider consumer i who searched Ri retailers in the search step in market t.33 The indirect
utility of consumer i for inside product j in market t conditional on the set of retailers Ri
searched, denoted by Uijt|Ri , is:
Uijt|Ri = −αipjt + xjtβ + τDd + τDm + τDr + τDt + ξjt + εˆijt, (1)
i = 1, . . . , It, j ∈ JˆtRi = {jˆ : jˆ ∈ Jt is sold by retailer r ∈ Ri} ∪ {0}, t = 1, . . . , T,
where Ri denotes the subset of retailers searched by consumer i in market t; JˆtRi is the
consideration set of consumer i, given by the subset of products sold by all the retailers
33Note that the set of searched retailers is market specific. To simplify the notation we omit the market
subscript and we refer to the set of searched retailers as Ri instead of Rit.
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searched and the outside product; pjt is the price of product j in market t; xjt is a S-
dimensional (row) vector of observable characteristics of product j in market t; τDd , τDm , τDr ,
and τDt capture the preferences for display format d, manufacturer m, retailer r, and monthly
seasonal effects in market t, using fixed dummy variables for display format, manufacturer,
retailer, and monthly seasonal effects, respectively; ξjt is the valuation of unobserved (by the
econometrician) characteristics of product j in market t; εˆijt is a stochastic term described
below; αi are individual-specific parameters that capture consumers’ preferences for price
as described below; and β is a S-dimensional vector of parameters. In each market t, we
normalize the characteristics of the outside product, j = 0, such that p0kt = x0t = τD0 = ξ0t =
0 for all t. Denote by U ijˆt ≡ −αipjˆt + xjˆtβ + τDd + τDm + τDr + τDt + ξjˆt the indirect utility of
consumer i for product jˆ ∈ JˆtRi in market t, net of the stochastic term, εˆijt. We model the
distribution of consumers’ preferences for price as follows:
αi = α + Σνi, νi ∼ Pν(νi) = N (0, 1),
where α and Σ are parameters, νi captures unobserved (by the econometrician) individual
characteristics, and Pν(·) is a parametric distribution assumed to be a standardized Normal,
N (0, 1), for the estimation. Denote by δjˆt ≡ −αpjˆt + xjˆtβ + τDd + τDm + τDr + τDt + ξjˆt the
mean utility for product jˆ in market t (i.e. the portion of the utility that is constant across
types of consumers). Note that U ijˆt = δjˆt − Σνipjˆt for all i, jˆ, and t.
Consumers have preferences that are specific to each distribution channel (or retailer
type), and the outside product. We capture this by decomposing the stochastic term, εˆijt,
using the distributional assumptions of the nested logit with a factor structure (e.g. Berry
1994, Cardell 1997):
εˆijt = ζigt + (1− λ)εijt, g ∈ {0, 1, 2},
where g ∈ {0, 1, 2} define three groups (or nests) of nonoverlapping products for the outside
product (denoted g = 0 with only one product), the products sold by the DSC retailers
(denoted g = 1), and the products sold by the VSC retailers (denoted g = 2); ζigt has a unique
distribution such that εˆijt is extreme value (see Cardell 1997), and λ is a nesting parameter
such that 0 ≤ λ < 1. A larger value of λ corresponds to a greater correlation in preferences
for products in the same distribution channel and the outside product. Thus, a larger value
of λ is associated with less substitution between products in different distribution channels
and the outside product. Similarly, when λ = 0 the model in the second step collapses to
a standard random coefficient mixed logit model (e.g. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995;
Nevo 2001), with no preference heterogeneity for distribution channels or the outside product,
but with endogenous choice set from the search step (e.g. Moraga-González, Sándor, and
Wildenbeest 2015), as described below.
For the estimation in subsection 4.1 it is convenient to write the nested logit choice
probability as the product of two standard logit probabilities. Denote by Pijˆt|Ri the nested
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logit probability that individual i chooses product jˆ in period t conditional on the searched
retailers, Ri. Then we have:
Pijˆt|Ri = Pijˆt|gˆRi × Pigˆt|Ri , (2a)
=
exp(IigˆRi)
exp(IgˆRi)
×
exp
(
U ijˆt
1−λ
)
exp
(
IigˆRi
1−λ
) , (2b)
i = 1, . . . , It, jˆ ∈ (gˆ ∩ JˆtRi), gˆ ∈ {0, 1, 2}, t = 1, . . . , T,
where the first equality follows from the law of total probability; Pijˆt|gˆRi is the conditional
probability of choosing product jˆ given that the product is in group gˆ and in the consideration
set, JˆtRi ; Pigˆt|Ri is the marginal conditional probability of choosing a product in group gˆ given
that the product is in the consideration set JˆtRi ; the last equality follows from the nested
logit structure using the decomposition into two standard logit probabilities (see appendix
C for details); and the inclusive values, IigˆRi and IgˆRi , are given by:
IigˆRi ≡ (1− λ)E
[
max
j∈(gˆ∩JˆtRi )
Uijt|Ri
]
,
= (1− λ) log
∑
j∈(gˆ∩JˆtRi )
e
Uijt/(1−λ), (3a)
IgˆRi ≡ log
(
1 +
2∑
g=1
eIigˆRi
)
, (3b)
where E(·) is the expectation operator taken over the i.i.d. shocks within group gˆ; the equation
in (3a) follows from the maximum expected value of the logit model (i.e. within group gˆ);34
and the equation in (3b) follows because the inclusive value of the outside product is equal
to zero.
3.1.3 Step 1: Search step
Consumers know the products available in each market, but do not know the price, pjt, or
the realization of the random shocks, εˆijt, associated with each inside product.35 Consumers
can purchase an inside product only if they collect information about its price and random
shock. They can engage in costly search to collect this information. A consumer who does
not search, can only buy the outside product. The cost of consumers of collecting information
about prices and random shocks from each VSC retailer is sV SC , and from each DSC retailer
34See, e.g., footnote 70 in appendix C for details.
35Before searching consumers only know the distributions of the prices, F˜pt(p), and random shocks, εˆijt.
See page 18 and footnote 39 for details.
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is sDSC .36 We assume that if consumers search a retailer, they collect information about all
the products sold by that retailer. Thus, our search costs are the cost of searching a retailer,
not the cost of searching a product. The VSC retailers sell the products from multiple
manufacturers (Panel B in table 1). Thus, searching for a VSC retailer allows consumers to
collect the information about a larger set of products than searching for a DSC retailer. This
allows us to rationalize the lower price dispersion observed in the VSC relative to the DSC
(figures 2 and A2 discussed in subsubsection 2.3.3).37
We consider a fixed sample search process following De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and Wilden-
beest (2012), Honka (2014), and Moraga-González, Sándor, and Wildenbeest (2015). First,
consumers commit to search a fixed number of retailers. (The number could be zero, in which
case the consumer buys the outside product in the purchase step.) This commitment is done
before beginning the search. The search finishes after consumers searched all the retailers
they committed to, even if they obtain a favorable search outcome early on.38
The expected net value for consumer i of searching a subset of retailers Ri in market t,
denoted by VtRi , is the difference between the expected maximum utility of buying the most
preferred product in that subset and the cost of searching for these retailers, denoted by
SCRi . That is:
VtRi =
∫
max
j∈Jˆi
Uijt dFεˆ(εˆ) dF˜pt(p)− SCRi + ε˜itRi =∫
log
(
1 +
2∑
gˆ=1
eIgˆRi
)
dF˜pt(p) + γˆ − SCRi + ε˜itRi , (4)
where F˜pt(p) is the distribution of (inside) products’ prices known by the consumers in market
t, that we describe below; SCRi is the cost of searching the subset of retailers Ri, that we
describe below; ε˜itRi is a random shock to the subset of searched retailers, that we described
below; the equality in the second line follows from the expected maximum utility of the nested
logit model conditional on the searched retailers (see appendix C for details); γˆ = 0.5772 is
the Euler’s constant; and IgˆRi is the inclusive value of the set of products from the searched
retailers that belong to subset gˆ (excluding the outside product), and is given by:
36The search cost includes the time spent to find and collect information about retailers, and processing
costs (e.g. investigating in the retailer’s webpage). Hence, our definition of search costs encompasses the cost
of including a product at the purchase occasion and an evaluation cost (Hauser and Wernerfelt 1990).
37See Wolinsky (1986) and Haan and Moraga-González (2011) for a theoretical analysis about the impact
of search costs on the observability of prices.
38In our model, consumers are firms demanding advertising. The decision of how many retailers to contact
is typically made ex ante. This practice was explained to us by industry members. The fixed sample search
assumption in our model is intended to capture such practice. See Morgan and Manning (1985) for a formal
discussion of this behavior. For a discussion of the sequential and fixed sample search processes see, e.g.,
Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006), De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and Wildenbeest (2012), and the references
there.
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IgˆRi ≡ (1− λ) log
∑
j∈(gˆ∩JˆtRi\{0})
eU ijt/(1−λ), gˆ ∈ {1, 2}. (5)
Before searching, consumers only know the distribution of prices of the (inside) products
available in market t, F˜pt(p). We assume that consumers know the true distribution of prices
in each market desegregated by distribution channel (or type of retailer). This is equivalent
to say that consumers know two distributions of prices: the distribution of prices for the DSC
retailers, and the distribution of prices for the VSC retailers. Consumers learn the prices of
the set of products sold by each retailer when they search such retailer.39 We model the cost
of searching a subset Ri of retailers in t, SCRi , as (see appendix D for details):
SCRi = S¯ × {#mr1}+ · · ·+ S¯ × {#mrQ}, (6)
where Ri = {r1, . . . , rQ} is the subset of searched retailers, rq with q = 1, . . . , Q, each of
the searched retailers in t, S¯ is a parameter, and {#mrq} denotes the number of different
manufacturer for which rq has product availability in market t. In words, equation (6) says
that consumers pay a search cost S¯ for each manufacturer sold by the retailer searched.
We model the search problem of the consumer from an stochastic point of view. To do
that, we add a random shock to the subset of searched retailers, ε˜itRi in the equation in
(4), as in De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and Wildenbeest (2012) and Moraga-González, Sándor,
and Wildenbeest (2015). We do this for two reasons. First, the random shock has a natural
interpretation in our setting. It captures consumer specific variation in the search costs for
the retailers that are unobserved to the econometrician. The variance of this shock measures
the degree of heterogeneity of consumers’ search cost for retailers.40 Second, solving for a
consumer’s optimal search strategy is a difficult problem. The consumer must simultaneously
choose among a set of ranked stochastic options. Each choice is costly and only the best
realized option is exercised. When there are many alternatives available in the market,
finding the optimal choice set is extremely complex because there are many choice sets to
be evaluated. By approaching this problem from an stochastic perspective, we smooth the
choice set probabilities (of choosing a given subset of retailers), and we do not need to solve
39We have also performed the analysis using the following information structures for F˜pt(p): (i) Consumers
only know the overall distribution of prices. That is, consumers only know one distribution with the prices
for all the products in the market. (ii) Consumers know the distribution of each product in the market
desegregated by distribution channel and by product. That is, consumers know 57 distribution of prices,
where the number 57 corresponds to the number of inside products in the sample (see footnote 24).
Under the information structure in (i), consumers have less information than in the benchmark (i.e. where
consumers know two distribution of prices, by distribution channel). Under the information structure in (ii),
consumers have more information than in the benchmark. We obtained similar results in terms of the welfare
analysis under the benchmark, and under (i) and (ii). Model 2 in table A2 in the appendix, shows the results
under (i).
40Alternatively, it can be interpreted as measuring the degree of heterogeneity in the errors that consumers
make when evaluating the net expected gain of a subset of retailers (De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and Wildenbeest
2012).
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the search problem of every consumer. Instead we compute the probability that a given
subset of retailers is searched by a consumer.41 We assume that the term ε˜itRi is drawn i.i.d.
(across individuals, markets, and sets of retailers) from a type I extreme value distribution
with location parameter µε˜ = 0 and scale parameter σε˜ > 0.42,43 Denote by Ψ ≡ (S¯, σε˜) the
vector of search costs parameters.
Consumer i chooses the subset of searched retailers, Ri, that maximizes the expected net
benefit of searching, VtRi . The probability that consumer i finds optimal to sample the subset
of retailers Ri in market t, denoted by PRi , is:
PRi =
eV tRi/σε˜∑
Rˆi∈Λ e
V
tRˆi
/σε˜
, (7)
where V tRi ≡ VtRi − ε˜itRi , is the expected value of searching a subset of retailers Ri net of
the shock ε˜itRi , with VtRi given by the equation in (4); Λ is the powerset of all retailers; and
the equality follows the well known logit choice probability.44
3.1.4 Choice Probabilities and Market Shares
The unconditional choice probability of consumer type i for product j in market t is:
Pijt =
∑
R′i∈Λ
Pijt|R′i × PR′i , (8a)
=
∑
R′i∈Λ
Pijt|gR′i × Pigt|R′i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pijt|R′
i
× PR′i , (8b)
=
∑
R′i∈Λ
exp(IigR′i)
exp(IgR′i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pijt|gR′
i
×
exp
(
U ijt
1−λ
)
exp
( IigR′
i
1−λ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pigt|R′
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pijt|R′
i
× e
V
tR′
i
/σε˜∑
Rˆi∈Λ e
V
tRˆi
/σε˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
PR′
i
, (8c)
i = 1, . . . , It, j ∈ Jt, g ∈ {0, 1, 2}, t = 1, . . . , T,
where the equality in (8a) follows from the law of total probability; the equality in (8b) follows
from the equation in (2a); and the equality in (8c) follows by replacing the expressions for
Pijˆt|gˆRi and Pigˆt|Ri by the equation in (2b) (purchase step), and by replacing the expression
for PR′i by the equation in (7) (search step).
Intuitively, equation (8) says that the unconditional probability that consumer type i
41An alternative procedure is provided by Chade and Smith (2006) with the Marginal Improvement Algo-
rithm. This procedure is not computationally feasible in our empirical application, as explained above.
42I.e. the cumulative distribution function is: F (ε˜ijt) = e−e
−ε˜ijt/σε˜ .
43Similar to De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and Wildenbeest (2012), the scale parameter, σε˜, is identified because
we have already normalized the scale of the ordinal utility of the consumer. This was done by normalizing
the scale parameter of the stochastic term εˆijt in equation (1) to σεˆ = 1.
44See, e.g., McFadden (1978).
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chooses product j in market t is the weighted average of the conditional choice probability
of each consideration set (or subset of retailers R′i), where the weight of each consideration
set is given by the unconditional probability that the consumer finds it optimal to sample
that subset of retailers, PR′i . In our model this weighted average of probabilities (equation
8a) can be written as the product of three standard logit formulas that are linked (equation
8c): (i) the conditional probability of choosing product j given that it belongs to group g
and is sold by the subset of searched retailers Ri (Pijt|gR′i); (ii) the conditional probability of
choosing a product in group g given that is sold by the subset of searched retailers (Pigt|R′i);
(iii) and the unconditional probability that the consumer finds optimal to sample the subset
of retailers (PR′i). The probabilities in (i) and (ii) are linked through the inclusive value IigRi .
This inclusive value is the expected utility of consumer i from choosing a product among
the ones in nest g, as can be seen from the equation in (3a).45 The parameter λ reflects
the degree of correlation in preferences for products in the same distribution channel. When
λ = 0, the probabilities in (i) and (ii) collapse to a standard (random coefficients) logit
model. Similarly, these probabilities are linked to the probability in (iii) through the subsets
of searched retailers (or consideration sets). These subsets of retailers, R′i, enter in the value
V tR′i , and in the inclusive values IigR′i and IgR′i . The parameters in the search costs, SCitR′i ,
determine the probability that the consumer finds it optimal to search R′i retailers. When all
search costs are zero, the consumer searches all retailers with probability one, and PR′i = 0
for any other subset R′i of retailers. Therefore, equation (8) collapses to Pijt = Pijt|g × Pigt,
a standard random coefficients nested logit model without search.46
The market share function for product j in market t, denoted by sjt, is obtained by
integrating over the distribution of consumer types:47
sjt =
∫
νi
Pijt dPν(νi), (9)
where Pijt is given by the equation in (8); and Pν(·) is a parametric distribution assumed to
be a standardized Normal, N (0, 1), for the estimation.48
3.2 Manufacturers and Retailers
In this subsection we present the supply side of the industry. The supply side model has two
main characteristics. First, the industry consists of two layers of activity that are related
vertically (e.g. Brenkers and Verboven 2006; Bonnet and Dubois 2010; Villas-Boas 2007), as
displayed in figure 1. Second, there are two distribution channels (or retailers’ types), where
45This takes the standard logit formula because the choice of products within the nest g is a logit.
46If the nesting, price heterogeneity, and search costs parameters equal zero (i.e. if λ = Σ = S¯t = sDrt = 0
for all D, t), then the demand model collapses to a standard logit model, and Pijt = e
δjt/
∑Jt
jˆ=0
e
δ
jˆt in equation
(8). Similarly, our random coefficient nested logit model with search collapses to the nested logit model if
Σ = S¯t = s
D
rt = 0 for all D, t.
47Note that the market share is a function of the parameters and the characteristics of the products.
48For the estimation we approximate the integral in (9) by: sjt = 1NS
∑NS
ns=1 sjt(vns), where vns with
ns = 1, . . . , NS are draws from Pv(·) = N (0, 1).
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consumers can buy advertising: the direct sales channel (DSC) and the vertical sales channel
(VSC). The game unfolds in two stages. In the first stage, manufacturers and VSC retailers
bargain over wholesale prices through Nash bargaining (e.g. Crawford and Yurukoglu 2012;
Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas 2010; Grennan 2013; Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town
2015). In the second stage VSC and DSC retailers set retail prices to consumers, through
Bertrand competition.
3.2.1 Set Up
Consider an industry with a two layered vertical structure: (i) the manufacture layer, and
(ii) the retail layer. In the manufacture layer, multi-product firms, called manufactures,
produce basic production factors, called display formats, that they sell either to the VSC
retailers or directly to the consumers (if they have a DSC channel). A production factor
(display format) from a given manufacturer sold to different VSC retailers generates different
manufacture products. In the retail layer, multi-product firms, called VSC retailers, combine
manufacture products with their own retail production factors to produce retail products,
also called display formats, that they sell to final consumers. Retailers have free access to all
the information regarding the products that they carry in their portfolio.
We now present the notation to write the profit functions of the firms. There are
d = 1, . . . ,D basic production factors, m = m1, . . . ,mM manufacturers and r = r1, . . . , rR
retailers. Each manufacturer may sell their product through one of the retailers or directly
to the final consumer. Hence, there are, potentially, J = D×M× (R+ 1) final products.49
Not all the manufacturers have a DSC channel. Therefore, it is convenient to divide them
into pure manufacturers (those who sell only in the VSC) and hybrid manufacturers (those
who sell in both the VSC and DSC). Denote by ΩVm the set of products that manufacturer m
sells to VSC retailers, and by ΩDm the set of products that manufacturer m sells to consumers
directly. Denote by Ωr the set of products that retailer r sells to the final consumers. Denote
by ωj the wholesale price of manufacture product j, by ω the J × 1 vector of manufacture
wholesale prices, by µj the marginal cost of manufacture product j, and by µ the J ×1 vector
of manufacture marginal costs. Denote by pj the price of retail product j, by p the J × 1
vector of retail prices, by ρj the marginal cost of retail product j, and by ρ the J × 1 vector
of retail marginal costs. The profit function of hybrid manufacturers contains two terms:
the profits from selling the products in the VSC and in the DSC. For the profit of hybrid
manufacturers in the DSC, we assume that the marginal cost is the manufacture cost plus a
retail cost: µj + ρj. Finally, denote by M the market size, by sj(p) the share of product j
given by the equation in (9), and by s(p) the J × 1 share vector.50
49Some of these products may not be offered because some VSC retailers may not carry the products of
all manufacturers. As explained in subsection 2.2, the total number of inside products in our data is 57, and
the total possible products in the market is 81. See footnote 24 and table 1 for details.
50We omit the market subscript, t, for the variables in this subsection to simplify the notation.
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The profit of a VSC retailer r is:
Πr =
∑
j∈Ωr
(pj − ωj − ρj)Msj(p),
The profit of a pure manufacturer m is:
Πpurem =
∑
j∈ΩVm
(ωj − µj)Msj(p),
The profit of an hybrid manufacturer m is:
Πhybm =
∑
j∈ΩVm
(ωj − µj)Msj(p) +
∑
j∈ΩDm
(pj − µj − ρj)Msj(p),
where we allow that the manufacture marginal costs of a given display format to differ
depending on whether it is sold to the consumer or to a VSC retailer (i.e. we allow for ρj > 0
for j ∈ ΩVm). In subsection 4.2 we set ρj = 0 for all j ∈ ΩVm to identify the supply system.
To account for the dual channel, but keep the equations compact, we define ω˜k as:
ω˜k =
ωk, k ∈ ΩVm,pk − ρk, k ∈ ΩDm.
Then, the profit of manufacturers (pure or hybrid) can be written as:
Πm =
∑
j∈Ωm
(ω˜j − µj)Msj(p),
where Ωm = ΩVm for pure manufacturers, and Ωm = ΩVm ∪ ΩDm for hybrid manufacturers.
3.3 Equilibrium
We construct the equilibrium by working backwards. The game unfolds in two stages. In the
first stage manufacturers and VSC retailers bargain over manufacture prices (i.e. wholesale
prices of display formats), in a Nash bargaining game. The equilibrium concept is Nash
equilibrium in Nash bargains. We call this the “manufacture game.” In the second stage
VSC and DSC retailers set retail prices to the consumers, through a Nash Bertrand game.
We call this the the “retail game.” The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect equilibrium
(equilibrium henceforth). We solve for the equilibrium by backward induction, starting with
the retail game. Equilibrium prices are denoted with superscripts “∗”.
3.4 Stage 2: The Retail Game
The standard equilibrium first order necessary conditions for pj are:
sj(p
∗) +
∑
k∈Ωr
(p∗k − ωk − ρk)
∂sk(p
∗)
∂pj
= 0, (10a)∑
k∈ΩVm
(ωk − µk) ∂sk(p
∗)
∂pj
+ sj(p
∗) +
∑
k∈ΩDm
(p∗k − µk − ρk)
∂sk(p
∗)
∂pj
= 0, (10b)
22
The system of equations in (10) defines retail prices implicitly as a function of wholesale
prices, p∗ = P(ω) by applying the implicit function theorem to (10).
3.5 Stage 1: The Manufacture Game
Manufacturers and VSC retailers bargain bilaterally and simultaneously over wholesale prices,
ωj, as in Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and Collard-Wexler, Gowrisankaran, and Lee (2016).51
The equilibrium concept is Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains: no manufacturer-retailer pair
would like change their agreement, given all other agreements.52 Motivated by our empirical
setting, where VSC retailers negotiate with manufacturers each display format separately, we
assume that all manufacturer-retailer pairs negotiate each wholesale price separately, as in
Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas (2010) and Bonnet, Bouamra-Mechemache, and Molina
(2016).53 If the negotiations over ωj fail, manufacture and retail products j are not sold. If
the negotiations over ωj succeed, the profit of manufacturer m from manufacture product
j is Πmj(ω) = (ωj − µj)Msj(P(ω)), and the profit of retailer r from retail product j is
Πrj(ω) =
(
p∗j − ωj − ρj
)
Msj(P(ω)). Denote by Πr,−j and Πm,−j the disagreements payoffs
of retailer r and manufacturer m, respectively, when they bargain over ωj. Denote by νrmj
the bargaining weight of retailer r when it bargains with manufacturer m over ωj, and define
δSrmj ≡ (1−νrmj)νrmj . The Nash product of manufacturer m and retailer r for ωj is:
Nrmj ≡
[∑
k∈Ωr
(p∗k − ωk − ρk)Msk(P(ω))− Πr,−j
]νrmj [∑
k∈Ωw
(ω˜k − µk)Msk(P(ω))− Πm,−j
]1−νrmj
,
= [Πr(ω
∗)− Πr,−j]νrmj
[
Πm(ω
∗)− Πm,−j
]1−νrmj . (11)
Denote by Ωx\ {j}, x = r,m, the set of products firm x sells minus product j. De-
note by ω−j the (J − 1) × 1 vector of manufacture prices without element ωj. Denote by
∆s−jk (P(ω−j)) the change in the market share of product k if product j is not offered. We as-
sume that the disagreement profits for manufacture m and retailer r when they bargain over
ωj are the maximum profits each could earn if product j were not offered, where the parties
assume that other contracts would not be renegotiated if they did not reach an agreement.
Hence, the disagreements payoffs are:
Πr,−j ≡
∑
k∈Ωr\{j}
(pk − ωk − ρk)Ms−jk (P(ω−j)),
Πm,−j ≡
∑
k∈Ωm\{j}
(ω˜k − µk)Ms−jk (P(ω−j)).
Note that the bargaining game takes place only over products that are sold in the VSC.
51See also Arie, Grieco, and Rachmilevitch (2016).
52Each pair of players maximizes the bilateral gains from trade, modeled by an asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution, given the strategies of all others pairs.
53An alternative assumption, followed by Bonnet, Bouamra-Mechemache, and Molina (2016), is that each
pair of manufacturer-retailer negotiate all their products jointly.
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However, when hybrid manufacturers bargain with retailers, the Nash product expression
includes profits from both the VSC and DSC. This is because a change in the wholesale price
that the parties negotiate will affect sales in the DSC channel as well.
The first order necessary equilibrium conditions for ωj are:
νrmj [Πr(ω
∗)− Πr,−j]νrmj−1
[
Πm(ω
∗)− Πm,−j
]1−νrmj ∂Πr(ω∗)
∂ωj
+
(
1− νrmj
)
[Πr(ω
∗)− Πr,−j]νrmj
[
Πm(ω
∗)− Πm,−j
]−νrmj ∂Πm(ω∗)
∂ωj
= 0, j = 1, ...,J . (12)
4 Estimation
4.1 Demand: Estimation and Instruments
We estimate the parameters that characterize demand without using the supply side model.
For the estimation we use an adapted version of the procedure proposed by Moraga-González,
Sándor, and Wildenbeest (2015, henceforth MSW), as described below. To identify the
price coefficient and the heterogeneity parameters we rely on instruments with the exclusion
restrictions discussed below. To identify the search costs parameters, we construct additional
micro moments using Google search data as described below. Finally, we identify the value
to consumers of the services provided by the VSC retailers by using the model and comparing
instances where the same combination of display format and manufacturer is sold by DSC
and VSC retailers.
4.1.1 Estimation
We estimate the demand model using the data from subsection 2.2 adapting the procedure
used by MSW. The procedure by MSW adapts the nested fixed algorithm used by Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995, henceforth BLP) by allowing for an endogenous choice set
for each consumer type i, which is the outcome of the search step. There are four major
differences in our procedure relative to the one by MSW. First, due to our research question,
we account for consumers’ preferences for the two distribution channels. This introduces
the additional multiplicative term, Pigt|R′i , to the choice probability in equation (8c), which
enters into the market share computation in equation (9). Second, we identify the parameters
on the demand side without specifying a functional form for the supply side, while in MSW
identification relies on the functional form of a supply equation, similar to BLP. Third, due to
the nature of our empirical setting, we use micro moments to identify the search parameters.
Finally, related to the previous points, the instruments and identifying assumptions are
different.
The model is estimated by GMM and relies on the moment condition E[Z ′ · ω(θ∗)] = 0,
where Z is a matrix of instruments, ω(·) is a structural error term defined below, and θ∗ =
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(α,Σ, λ,Ψ) is the true value of the parameters. The GMM estimate is:
θˆ = argmin
θ
[
ω(θ)′ZA−1Z ′ω(θ)
]
, (13)
where A is a consistent estimate of E(Z ′ωω′Z), described in appendix D.3.
We now describe the estimation procedure. For each candidate parameter vector, we
use equation (9) with the choice probability in equation (8c) to compute the market shares
as a function of the parameters.54 We define the error term as the unobserved products’
characteristics and compute it by solving for the mean utility level, δjt that equates:
sjt(pjt, xjt, δjt; Σ, λ,Ψ) = Sjt, (14)
where sjt(·) is the market share function given by the equation in (9); and Sjt are the observed
market shares obtained from the data. We use a contraction mapping55 to solve for the
implicit system of equations in (14) and identify the vector of mean utility levels. After solving
this system of equations, the structural error term is defined as ω ≡ δjt(p, x, S; Σ, λ,Ψ)+αpjt.
For the estimation, we concentrate the linear price parameter, α, out of the optimization
problem to reduce the dimensionality of the nonlinear search.
We compute the standard errors for the estimates using the standard procedures (e.g.,
Hansen 1982, Newey and McFadden 1994), correcting them to account that the simulation
draws are the same for all of the observations in a market (e.g. BLP).
4.1.2 Identification and Instruments
We rely on instruments with exclusion restrictions to identify the price coefficient and the
heterogeneity parameters. Identification of these parameters requires at least one instrument
for price and each heterogeneity parameter (Berry and Haile 2014, henceforth BH). Iden-
tification of search costs parameters relies on the search costs specification in our setting,
exogenous variation of product availability within retailers in the VSC across markets with
full support conditional on the other variables, and availability of Google search data to
construct the relevant micro moments, as defined below.56 The value added by the VSC re-
tailers is identified by comparing instances where the same combination of display format and
manufacturer is sold the DSC and VSC, and using the model to infer the value to consumers.
54The main difference relative to BLP is that the choice probability and, hence, the market share function
incorporates the search step (this is the last term in equation 8c, denoted by PR′i). Once the market share
function is computed, the estimation procedure resembles BLP, as developed by MSW.
55MSW show that the vector of unobserved characteristics can be computed as the unique fixed point of
a contraction mapping, similar to the one in BLP. Our contraction mapping is similar to the one in MSW.
The difference, relative to MSW, is that we have the additional multiplicative term, Pigt|R′i , to the choice
probability in equation (8c), which enters into the market share computation in equation (9).
56Utility and search costs parameters enter the purchase probability in different ways (De los Santos,
Hortaçsu, and Wildenbeest 2012; Moraga-González, Sándor, and Wildenbeest 2015). Moraga-González,
Sándor, and Wildenbeest (2015) provide conditions under which a combination of aggregate and consumer
search data can identify these parameters. Their main insight is to use certain ratios of choice probabilities
that do not depend on the search costs parameters.
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Price parameter, α. At least one instrument is needed to identify α due to price en-
dogeneity concerns (e.g. Berry 1994; BLP; Nevo 2001; BH). The structural error may be
correlated with prices because retailers make their pricing decisions with knowledge about
the valuations of the consumers in each market, conditional on the search step. In our case
the structural error term is the unobserved month specific deviation from the overall mean
valuation of the product. The supply side model in subsection 3.2 assumes that retailers in
the industry observe this deviation. It enters into the market-specific markup term in the
pricing equation, thus introducing a bias in the estimate of the price sensitivity, α. To address
price endogeneity we use prices of the same product in other markets as instruments for the
price of the product in the current market (e.g. Hausman 1996; Nevo 2001). The identifying
assumption is that month-specific valuations for a product are independent across time, after
accounting for display format, manufacturer, retailer, and months fixed effects. The prices
of the same product are correlated across months due to the common marginal cost, while
they are uncorrelated with month-specific valuations due to the exclusion restriction. We use
average retail and average wholesale prices (excluding in both cases the price of the product
in the month being instrumented) in all months, and lagged wholesale prices.57
Heterogeneity parameters, Σ and λ. The parameter Σ governs the distribution of the
random coefficients (or heterogeneity in consumer preferences) for price. An instrument is
needed to identify this parameter due to the endogeneity problem arising from the unknown
parameter Σ, interacting with the endogenous variables, (sjt, pjt) (see BH for details). We
use the differentiation instruments proposed by Gandhi and Houde (2016). We construct
instruments defined by a proximity measure counting the number of competitors located
within one standard deviation of product j. Specifically, we use the count of other products
whose prices lie within five Euros of the own price, and the interaction of this variable with
product and manufacturer dummy variables.58
The nested logit parameter, λ, governs the substitution within and between subgroups
of products (or nests) sold by the retailers in the DSC, VSC, and the outside product. An
instrument is needed due to the unknown parameter λ, interacting with the endogenous
within-group share (see BH). We use the number of products in the market within each
distribution channel as an instrument. This is a “BLP instrument”59 that has been previously
used to identify the nested logit parameter (e.g. Miller and Weinberg 2017). The identifying
assumption is that the structural error term is uncorrelated with the number of products
in the market within each distribution channel. The power of the instrument comes from
the number of products in the market within each distribution channel being negatively
correlated with the share of the products within that distribution channel.
57One could potentially use retail and wholesale prices in all other months as instruments. See Chamberlain
(1982) for a discussion of optimal instruments.
58We have also experimented with a band of ten Euros, and obtained similar results.
59See, e.g., BH for a discussion of these instruments.
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Search costs parameters, Ψ. Identification of search costs parameters relies on the fol-
lowing: (i) the search costs specification in our setting,60 (ii) exogenous variation of product
availability within retailers in the VSC across markets with full support conditional on the
other variables, and (iii) availability of search data with information about ratios of subset
of searched retailers. The main restriction for the cost specification is that consumers search
for retailers, but pay a search cost for each manufacturer sold by the VSC retailer. Then,
using exogenous variation across markets of product availability within retailers in the VSC,
we show that the search parameters can be written as function of the ratios of subset of
searched retailers, using the equation in (7). Finally, we show under which assumptions one
can use the Google search data to construct sample analogues of these ratios. See appendix
D for details.
Intuitively, if the search costs are high, consumers will only search for the more preferred
retailers. Thus, the prices of the products sold by the less preferred retailers would likely
not affect the market shares of the products sold by the more preferred retailers, because
the consumers will not be aware of possible lower prices from the less preferred retailers.
In contrast, price reductions of less preferred retailers can affect the market shares of most
preferred retailers when search costs are low. In general, consumers have more incentives to
search, the larger is the variance from the distribution of prices (known by the consumers
ex ante) of the inside products available in the market, denoted by F˜pt(p) in the model. So
the correlation between prices of less preferred retailers, and market shares of more preferred
retailers will be larger when this variance is large.
The main insight about using Google searches is that they capture the visibility of re-
tailers and manufacturers. We find that, for all retailers and manufacturers, the first result
displayed by Google Portugal was the webpage of the corresponding retailer/manufacturer,
after performing a search in Google Portugal with the name of the retailer/manufacturer
used to construct the variable. Google searches are a good proxy for searches in our setting,
because our data include all meaningful transactions in the industry and consumers search
for these retailers/manufacturers predominantly online. See appendix A.2 for details about
the Google search data. See appendix D for details about identification in our setting.
Value of VSC Retailers. We comment on the empirical variation that identifies the value
of VSC retailers. The identification problem arises due to the non existence of a counterfactual
scenario without the VSC retailers. We evaluate the performance of the market without the
VSC retailers by constructing such counterfactual scenario using our model and the fact
that, in the outdoor advertising industry, goods can be purchased by the final consumer from
either VSC or DSC retailers. To do that we compare instances where the same combination
of display format and manufacturer is sold by a DSC and a VSC retailer, and compute
the counterfactual value that the consumer would have obtained had the purchased been
made in a distribution channel different from the one actually used. Consider consumer
60See Honka (2014) for an early article using a similar approach as (i).
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i and suppose that a given combination of display format and manufacturer is sold by a
DSC and a VSC retailer in a given market, and that both types of retailers are part of the
consideration set of the consumer. The value of a VSC retailer to consumer i is determined
by the extent to which the consumer purchases from the VSC retailer, rather than from
DSC retailer. According to the model, there are three (non mutually exclusive) channels
for such decision by the consumer: (1) The VSC retailer offered a lower price due its access
to quantity discounts from the manufacturer (purchase aggregation services); (2) the VSC
retailer reduced the search costs to the consumer due to its access to the products of multiple
manufacturers (search services); and (3) the gross utility to the consumer of purchasing from
a VSC retailer is larger than the gross utility of purchasing from a DSC retailer (consulting
services). The model decomposes the value of VSC retailers to consumer i into (1), (2), and
(3), by constructing counterfactual scenarios where we remove each of these channels at a
time. We do the same for all consumer types, and then exploit the unique feature of our data
that we observe all the transactions in the industry to infer the value of VSC retailers.
4.2 Supply: Identification and Estimation
4.2.1 Identification
We now discuss identification of the parameters from the supply side conditional on the data
that we observe, and the estimated demand system. The parameters from the supply side
are: (i) the vector of retail marginal costs, ρ; (ii) the vector of manufacture marginal costs,
µ; and (iii) the vector of bargaining weights, δS. We observe the vector of retail prices, p∗,
the vector of wholesale prices, ω∗, the vector of market shares, s, and size of the market, M .
Using the procedure described in subsection 3.1, we have an estimate of the demand system,
(s(p∗),∇ps, s).
The first order conditions from the retail game in the equation in (10) provide a system
of J equations that “just identifies” the J vector of retail marginal costs (ρ). The first
order conditions from the manufacture game in the equation in (12) also provide a system
of J equations. Thus, in general, equation (12) cannot be used to identify both, the vector
of vector of manufacture marginal costs (µ) and bargaining weights (δS) which jointly has
dimension 2× J , without additional restrictions.
In our case, we obtain these additional restrictions using the particularity of the vertical
structure in our empirical setting. Namely, that manufacturers sell the same display format
to both, consumers (charging DSC prices) and VSC retailers (charging wholesale prices). A
natural set of restrictions justified by this structure is that the manufacture marginal cost
of a given display format in a given month is the same whether it is sold to the consumer
or to a VSC retailer. In terms of the model, this implies that the manufacture marginal
costs, µ, could be recovered using the first order conditions from the retail game (in the
system in equation 10), without using the first order conditions from the manufacture game
(in the system in equation 12), because the manufacturers are DSC retailers. So, in the
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first step, we use the first order conditions from the retail game in the equation in (10) to
identify the vector of retail and manufacture marginal costs, using the fact that manufacture
marginal costs are the same for a display format sold to a VSC retailer and to the consumer.
In other words, µ is contained in ρ in our setting. Then, in the second step, we use the
first order conditions from the manufacture game in the equation in (12) to identify the
bargaining weights. The J vector of bargaining weights, δS, is “just identified” using the
system in equation (12) conditional on the estimated manufacture marginal costs, ρ, from
the retailer game. In the next subsubsection we estimate the bargaining weights without
imposing additional restrictions to the manufacture game. Our identification arguments
exploit the vertical structure in our empirical setting and, thus, are different from the ones
used previously in the literature (e.g. Grennan 2013; Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town 2015;
Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas 2010).61
4.2.2 Estimation of Marginal Costs and Bargaining weights
We follow Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town (2015, pp. 187-188), with the modifications
noted below. We start using the first order necessary conditions from the retail game in the
equation in (10). To recover the vector of marginal costs we need to compute the element
∂skt(p∗)
∂pjt
in the matrix [∇ps]′. Changing the price of a single product has a negligible impact
upon the ex ante price expectations in each distribution channel, therefore not affecting the
choice probabilities for each set of stores, i.e.,
∂sR′
i
∂pjt
≈ 0. Thus:
∂skt(p∗)
∂pjt
=
∫
i
∂sijt(p∗)
∂pjt
dvi,
=
∫
i
∑
R′i∈Λ
∂sijt|R′i
∂pjt
× sR′i
 dvi.
From Grigolon and Verboven (2014, p. 934) the last derivative is given by:
∂sijt|R′i
∂pkt
=

αi
(
sijt +
σ
1−σsijt|g − 11−σ
)
sijt if j = k,
αi
(
sikt +
σ
1−σsikt|g
)
sijt if j, k are in the same nest g,
αisiktsijt if j, k are in different nests,
where αi > 0.
61For example, Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas (2010) use observed prices and quantities to estimate
demand parameters. In addition, they have cost data, which they use to estimate marginal costs. Finally,
they use the first order conditions to estimate the bargaining parameters. Grennan (2013) also uses observed
prices and quantities to estimate demand parameters. However, he does not have cost data. This means
that he cannot estimate all the bargaining and marginal cost parameters. Hence, he imposes restrictions on
marginal cost parameters, and then uses first order conditions to estimate bargaining parameters. We use a
somewhat different approach. Prior knowledge of the industry structure allows us to reduce the dimension
of the marginal costs parameters (so that manufacture marginal costs can be estimated with the retailer
marginal costs). Then, we use the first order conditions from the bargaining game to estimate the bargaining
parameters alone.
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Next, we use the first order necessary conditions from the manufacture game in the
equation in (12). Applying the envelope theorem and simplifying, we obtain the following
expression used to recover the bargaining weights (see appendix E for details):
µ = ω∗ − δS (ΛM  s)−1 (ΛR  s) (p∗ − ω∗ − ρ) , (16)
where:
s ≡

s1 −∆s−12 · · · −∆s−1J
−∆s−21 s2 · · · −∆s−2J
...
... . . .
...
−∆s_J1 −∆s−J2 · · · sJ
 ,
is the matrix of shares and changes in shares in Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas (2010,
p. 62, first matrix) with ∆s−jk ≡ s−jk (P(ω))− sk(P(ω)) denoting the difference between the
market share of product k if product j is offered and if it is not; and δS is the vector of
bargaining weights as defined above.
For the estimation we parameterize the manufacturers’ marginal costs, µjt, as:
µjt = γ0 + γ
S
d + γ
S
m + γ
S
t + ˆjt, (17)
where γ0 is a constant; γSd , γSm, and γSt capture marginal cost for display format d, manufac-
turer m, and month of the year t, using fixed dummy variables for display format, manufac-
turer, and monthly seasonal effects in market t, respectively; and ˆjt is an unobservable error
term. Denote by γ ≡ (γ0, γSd , γSm, γSt ).
Rearranging terms, write the supply unobservable error term as:
ˆ(γ, ρ, δS) = ω∗ − γ0 − γSd − γSm − γSt − δS
(
ΛM  s)−1 (ΛR  s) (p∗ − ω∗ − ρ) , (18)
which is analogue to Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town (2015, equation 19).
For the estimation we assume that the unobservable determinants of costs are i.i.d across
products j and markets t, and further set the retailers’ marginal cost to zero, ρjt = 0 ∀ (j, t).
We believe these are sensible assumptions in our empirical setting for two reasons. First,
because manufacturers and retailers’ marginal costs are quite low in this industry and vary
little across firms and markets (e.g. see table 6 discussed in next section). Second, because
our interest in the supply side parameters is as inputs for counterfactual scenarios without
intermediaries in subsection 6.2, not necessary the parameters by themselves.62 In particular,
we perform the estimation in subsection 5.2 by choosing the value of the parameters, (γ, ρ, δS),
62Alternatively, one can perform the estimation by using the supply side moment condition E[ZS ·
ˆ(γ∗, ρ∗, δS
∗
)] = 0, where ZS is a matrix of supply side instruments, ˆ(·) is the error term defined in equation
(18), and (γ∗, ρ∗, δS
∗
) is the true value of the supply parameters. We have also performed the estimation
using an expression analogue to the equation in (17) for retailers’ marginal costs with no unobservable de-
terminants, and obtained retailers’ marginal costs were very close to zero. Results described in this footnote
are available upon request.
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that minimize the sum of squared errors (given by the equation in 18), subject to the demand
estimates, µjt ∈ [0, pmjt], ρjt = 0, and δS ∈ (0, 1).
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Demand Estimates
Table 5 provides the estimates of the demand model. The table displays estimates from the
following specifications of the model. (1) A simple logit model (without random coefficients
for price, without channel specific preferences, without search). (2) A mixed logit model
(without channel specific preferences and without search). (3) A mixed logit model with
channel specific preferences (without search). (4) A mixed logit model with channel specific
preferences and with search. The latter specification corresponds to the full model as de-
scribed in subsection 3.1. Models 4 uses the additional Google micro moment implemented
using the equation in (D.5) described in appendices A.2 and D. All the specifications include
a set of dummy variables for manufacturers, retailers, display formats, and months fixed
effects. The instruments used in the GMM specifications are described in subsection 4.1.
For the estimation of each model, we apply the estimation procedure from subsection 4.1,
with the obvious modifications. For example, for the simple logit, model 1, the structural
error in the system of equations in (14) has a closed-form expression, the search step in
subsection 3.1.3 is skipped, and the model is estimated by OLS. For models 2 and 3, we
solve for the structural error using the contraction mapping, and skip the search step. The
demand estimates do not impose the equilibrium conditions from the supply side.
The estimated parameters have the expected signs, and are sensible in magnitude. Three
conclusions emerge from this table. First, by comparing the estimates from models 1 and
2, one can see the role of accounting for price endogeneity and unobserved price heterogene-
ity. The estimated mean price coefficient in model 2 is three (−0.164/−0.050) times higher in
absolute terms than the one in model 1. The coefficient for the standard deviation of the
random coefficients for price is statistically different from zero. Consumer heterogeneity is
important in this industry. Not accounting for these features may bias the estimated mean
price elasticity downwards.
Second, by comparing the estimates from models 2 and 3, one can see the role of ac-
counting for preference heterogeneity for the distribution channels. Model 3 allows for such
preference heterogeneity using the distribution assumptions of the nested logit. The null
hypothesis that there is no preference heterogeneity for the distribution channels (λ = 0) is
rejected. Model 2 precludes correlation in consumer preferences for the products in the same
distribution channel. In model 3 consumers select into the distribution channels based on
their preferences. They are less responsive (lower α in absolute value) and more homoge-
neous (lower Σ) in their taste for price for products in the same channel, relative to model
2. Overall, this result indicates that ignoring channel specific preferences may overestimate
price sensitivity/heterogeneity.
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Finally, by comparing the estimates from models 3 and 4, one can see the role of accounting
for consumer search. The search cost parameters, S¯ and σε˜, are precisely estimated. The
estimate of the scale parameter of the consideration sets, σε˜, is about 10 (1/0.095) times smaller
than the scale parameter of the utility function shock, which is normalized to 1. This result
indicates that factors affecting consumer choice of the consideration sets, unobserved for
the econometrician, play a relatively small role in our empirical setting. The mean price
estimate in model 4 is larger in absolute value than the one in model 2, consistent with prior
findings in Draganska and Klapper (2011) and De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and Wildenbeest
(2012). In other words, consumers are more sensitive to price in model 4 with search. This
indicates that ignoring consumer search (i.e. incorrectly assuming that consumers have full
information), may bias the estimated price elasticities downwards. The explanation is simple,
as emphasized by De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and Wildenbeest (2012, p. 2977): “[...] the price
changes we—as econometricians—observe in the data are not observed by consumers who
sample only a subset of the stores. A full information [...] model assumes that all prices are
observed, thus ascribing unresponsiveness to price changes to low price elasticity.” Overall,
the demand estimates in table 5 show that consumer search play a relatively large role in our
empirical setting. By facilitating search, intermediaries increase consumer welfare, as will be
reflected in the counterfactual analysis in subsection 6.3.
5.2 Supply Estimates
Table 6 provides the estimates of the supply parameters. For the estimation we follow the
procedure described in subsection 4.2. Panel A displays the estimates of selected parameters
of the manufacturers’ marginal cost from the equation in (17); panel B displays summary
statistics of the distribution of manufacturers’ marginal costs; and panel C displays the mean
bargaining weights.
The estimated parameters are sensible in magnitude. Two patterns stand out. First, panel
B shows that manufacturers’ marginal cost are relatively low in this industry, consistent with
expert industry reports as in, e.g., U.K. Office of Fair Trading (2011). For example, for 2
m2 panels, the mean wholesale price is 8.40 Euros per m2 (table 2), and the mean estimated
marginal cost is 1.30 Euros per m2 (0.872 + 0.431). Marginal costs vary little across firms,
display formats, and markets (months). The coefficient of variation is 0.4 (0.355/0.872). Second,
panel C shows that the VSC retailers have a relatively high bargaining weight in this industry,
0.8 on average. This number is consistent with: (i) the large percentage of sales made by
consumers through VSC retailers (85.2 percent in panel A, table 1), and (ii) the quantity
discounts obtained by VSC retailers from manufacturers on the wholesale prices (subsection
2.3).
We use the supply side parameters to simulate the counterfactual scenarios described
below in subsection 6.2.
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5.3 Robustness
We performed several robustness tests of our model. First, in table 5 we performed the
estimation of the demand model using different specifications, where we build up the full
demand model starting from a simple logit model. We also tested different specifications of
the supply model, as discussed in footnote 62. Second, we tested for different information
structures for the specification of the empirical distributions of prices, F˜pt(p), in table A2
discussed in footnote 39. Third, in unreported results we tested for different specifications of
the Google search micro moments using ratios of probabilities of different retailers in given
market (instead of ratios of probabilities of the same retailer in different markets as imple-
mented in table 5), and using the same specifications of the micro moment as in table 5 but
with the different definitions of Google searches in appendix A.2. Fourth, also in unreported
results we estimated the model using different instruments (e.g. using a different definition
of the differentiation instruments as discussed in footnote 58, using wholesale prices or lagged
wholesale prices to address price endogeneity, and using interactions of the latter variables
with product availability in the previous months). Sixth, we tested for different functional
form specifications of the search cost in the demand model (e.g. using an exponential func-
tion) and the counterfactual (see subsection 6.2.2). Seventh, we tested increasing/decreasing
the market size (to, respectively, 50 and 10 percent greater than the maximum observed to-
tal monthly sales). Finally, we tested using different nonlinear programming solvers, starting
values, number of simulated consumers, and seeds to control the generation of random num-
bers. The estimated parameters did vary sometimes across some of these robustness tests.
However, the implications discussed in subsections 5.1, 5.2, and 6.3 are robust in the cases
examined.
6 Welfare
In this section we use our estimates from section 5 to quantify the welfare impact of retail-
ers. We simulate four counterfactuals scenarios that we describe in subsection 6.2. We use
superscript c to denote a counterfactual.
6.1 Welfare Measures
We describe next the welfare measures used in the counterfactual analysis. The expected
consumer surplus, in Euros, for consumer type i is given by (see appendix C for details):
E(CSi) =
1
αi
σε˜ log
∑
R′i∈Λ
exp
1
σε˜
[
log
(
1 +
2∑
gˆ=1
eIgˆRi
)
− SCRi
]+ C, (19)
where E(·) denotes the expectation operator taken over both random shocks εˆijt and ε˜ijRi ;
the inclusive value, IgˆRi is given by the equation in (5); and C is a constant.63
63The constant indicates that the absolute level of utility cannot be measured.
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Consumer welfare for type i is defined as the change in the consumer surplus (or com-
pensating variation, CV ) that results from a change in the services offered by the retailers.
We compute the difference between the consumer surplus before and after such change. We
consider four changes in the services offered by the retailers that we describe in subsection
6.2. For the welfare results in subsection 6.3 we compute the total consumer surplus calcu-
lated as the weighted sum of E(CSi) using the weights reflecting the number of consumers
who face the same representative utilities as the sampled consumer. That is:
E(CV ) =
∫
νi
[
E(CS1i )− E(CS0i )
]
dPν(νi), (20)
where E(CV ) denotes the weighted sum across types of consumers of the compensating
variation; the superscripts 0 and 1 refer, respectively, to before and after the counterfactual
change in the services offered by the retailers; and E(CSi) is given by the equation in (19).
We describe the computation of the counterfactuals in next subsection.
6.2 Counterfactual Scenarios
Three channels through which VSC retailers affect consumers’ welfare in the outdoor adver-
tising industry are by providing: (i) consulting services, (ii) search services, and (iii) purchase
aggregation services (see subsection 2.1). We consider three counterfactual scenarios where
we turn off each of these channels, and an additional one where we turn off all three simul-
taneously. For each counterfactual scenario we compute the compensating variation using
equation (20). Below we describe how we compute each welfare scenario.
6.2.1 No Consulting Services
In this scenario, consumers may use the VSC, but VSC retailers do not offer consulting
services, defined as the gross utility of a given display format from the retailer. In subsection
3.1, the gross utility of the consumer of purchasing a display format from a given manufacturer
differed according to whether it was purchased through the VSC or DSC. We define the
difference in gross utilities between the VSC and DSC retailers as the consulting services
provided by the VSC retailers.
We implement this counterfactual by imposing that the gross utility of consuming a
display format from a given manufacturer (purchased through the VSC) to be the gross
utility of consuming the same display format of the same manufacturer purchased through
the DSC. According to the equation in (1) in the demand model, the gross utility for display
format d, produced by manufacturer m, and sold by retailer r, in market t, is given by:
τdmrt ≡ τDd + τDm + τDr + τDt .
The “no consulting services scenario,” denoted with the superscript “c1,” is implemented
by changing each component of that vector that corresponds to purchases made trough the
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VSC such that: τ c1dmrt = τdmmt, for every m, r and t.
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6.2.2 No Search Services
In this scenario, consumers may use the VSC, but VSC retailers do not offer search services.
According to our model, VSC retailers reduce consumers’ cost of searching. We implement
this counterfactual by increasing the search of consumers in a simple form. In equation
(6) consumers pay S¯ for each manufacturer sold by the retailer searched. In this counter-
factual consumers pay S¯ for each retailer-manufacturer combination carried by the retailer
searched.65
This counterfactual leaves constant the number of “stores” and display formats, and only
eliminates the search cost advantage of buying through a retailer instead of a manufacturer.
We then simulate the choice outcomes predicted by the demand model.
6.2.3 No Purchase Aggregation Services
In this scenario, we recompute the equilibrium prices using the supply side. According to the
model, the initial observed prices were set following first the bargaining game, then the retail
(or Nash Bertrand) game. In this counterfactual, we use the estimated supply parameters
to remove the purchase aggregation services, by recomputing prices assuming that they are
generated by two successive Nash Bertrand. We follow the following four steps. First, we
compute the optimal retail price function (as a function of any wholesale price) given by the
equation in (10). Second, we use the result from step 1 to solve numerically for the pass
through matrix defined by ∂pk/∂ωr for all k, r similar to the equation in (9) in Villas-Boas
(2007, p. 634). Third, we solve for the optimal wholesale prices in the two margins model,
using the equation in (12) with νrmj = 0, and step 2 to get ∇ws ≡ ∂s/∂ω′ = ∂s/∂p × ∂p/∂ω.
Finally, we solve for the optimal wholesale prices, ω, using the equation in (12) as obtained
from step 3, which is similar to the expression in (9) in Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas
(2010, p. 62). This gives an expression that is a function of ω and p that can be solved for
ω using the implicit function theorem applied to (12), because p∗ = P(ω). We then use the
new price vector and the estimated demand system to recompute the purchase decisions of
the consumers.
64The value τdmrt represents the gross utility of a display format d, produced by manufacturer m, and sold
to consumers by retailer r. In this counterfactual scenario, that product has the gross utility of a display
format d, produced by manufacturer m, and sold to consumers by manufacturer m (i.e. a DSC retailer),
τdmmt.
65For example, if the VSC retailer carries products of only 1 manufacturer, consumers’ search costs do
not change in the counterfactual. If the VSC retailer carries product of 2 (3) manufacturers, consumers
search costs increase by S¯ (2S¯). With this specification, the resulting increase of search costs is small. We
have explored other specifications and obtained similar conclusions as the ones in subsection 6.3. Results
are available upon request. The key insight of this counterfactual is that search costs increase without VSC
retailers.
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6.2.4 No Intermediaries’ Services
In this scenario, both VSC and DSC retailers operate, but VSC retailers do not offer either:
consulting, nor search, nor purchase aggregation services, as defined above. This is done
by implementing the three previous counterfactuals simultaneously. To evaluate the welfare
under the different scenarios we simulate the choice outcomes predicted by the demand model.
6.3 Counterfactual Results
Table 7 reports the results from the counterfactual scenarios above. Columns 1 to 4 compare
the results with the baseline predictions from the model. We report the following outcome
variables, which shed light on the relative importance of each of the potential benefits of VSC
retailers: the inside share (fraction of the market with purchases of inside products), DSC
as fraction of inside (fraction of inside purchases made through the DSC), mean posted/paid
prices, number of retailers searched, and the total change in the consumer surplus.
In column 1 we remove the consulting services differential between the VSC and the
DSC. We observe an increase in the total purchases, with a larger fraction coming from
the DSC. The number of retailers searched exhibit little variation. The change in the total
consumer surplus is negative. These results are a direct reflection of the estimated demand
system, which shows a larger gross utility for purchases in the VSC overall. It is consistent, for
example, with intermediaries providing additional services besides the advertising space (such
as assistance with the advertising design). In column 2 we remove the search services provided
by the intermediaries. The cost of searching increases for consumers. There is a decrease in
the amount purchases of inside products. The increase in search costs decreases the number of
retailers searched by 5 percent (5.89/6.19−1), even at the expense of higher prices paid. Overall,
consumers search more, buy less products, and pay higher prices, resulting in a relatively
large decrease in the total consumer surplus, mainly due to the increase in search costs. These
outcomes reflect the estimates of the search parameters in the demand system. In column
3 we remove the purchase aggregation services of the VSC retailers. Prices increase as a
consequence. Consumers respond by searching more, increasing the fraction purchased from
the DSC, and decreasing the amount of purchases of inside products. Again, total consumer
surplus decreases. Finally, in column 4 we simultaneously remove all services provided by
the VSC retailers. There is a large increase in prices, 43 percent on average (12.83/8.97 − 1).
The fraction of purchases from the DSC increases by 50 percent (27.88/18.68 − 1), while total
purchases decrease. On the one hand, higher prices induce consumers to search more. On
the other, the higher search costs induce them to search less. Column 4 shows that the net
effect is a decrease in the number of retailers searched. The change in the total consumer
surplus is negative and large. We interpret the welfare results from column 4 as the impact
that VSC retailers have on consumer welfare.
Two main conclusions rise from the counterfactual analysis. First, the presence of inter-
mediaries increases the welfare in this industry. This is not surprising in our setting, because
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consumers made 85 percent of the purchases through the VSC retailers. However, similar
channels to the ones analyzed here may be present in other industries/sectors, where the
counterfactual scenario without intermediaries may not be observable (i.e. where consumers
may not buy directly from the manufacturers). Measuring the welfare of intermediaries in
such cases (e.g. merger analysis), may also require quantifying the value of the services
provided by the intermediaries to consumers. Our framework may provide new insights for
such cases. Second, we find that the three services considered provide value to consumers
in this industry, with search playing an important role. This is, no doubt, specific to our
empirical setting. However, it shows the importance of specifying a flexible model that may
allow such quantification. Our analysis helps explain why intermediaries are ubiquitous in
modern economies, a subject that has received little empirical work.
7 Concluding Remarks
We proposed an empirical framework to quantify the welfare effects due to intermediation
in vertical markets. We employ structural econometric techniques in demand and supply
estimation, to isolate the different channels through which intermediaries may affect welfare.
We apply our empirical framework to the Portuguese outdoor advertising industry. We
recover the primitives of the industry, and simulate counterfactual scenarios to quantify the
welfare of the different services that retailers offer. We find that the presence of interme-
diaries increases the welfare in this industry, because the value of their services outweighs
the additional margin charged. Given that the outdoor advertising industry looks similar to
other vertical markets in several dimensions (U.K. Office of Fair Trading 2011), the results
of our policy studies may be used to learn about the effect of mergers in vertical markets,
where intermediaries provide additional services to consumers. Recent examples in the U.S.
include, e.g., disputes between Tesla and Automobile Dealer Association, or the proposed
merger of between Aetna and CVS.66 In such cases the value of intermediaries may be related
to the value of their services to the consumers.
Our empirical framework may be used to evaluate the implications of vertical mergers,
when intermediaries offer additional services to differentiate from the manufacturers. Our
model combines features that are present in other industries, like the ones discussed in the
previous paragraph. These features include consumers who have unobserved preferences
that are specific to each distribution channel and engage in costly search on the demand side,
and two layers of activity—where manufacturers and intermediaries bargain over wholesale
prices—with two distribution channels—where the two distribution channels compete a la
Bertrand—on the supply side.
66Regarding the U.S. car industry, in 48 states franchise laws prohibit/limit auto manufacturers from selling
directly to consumers, requiring the intermediation of car dealers. This has resulted in disputes between Tesla
Inc. and state auto dealer associations (Sibilla 2017). Regarding the proposed merger between Aetna and
CVS, one of the arguments in favor is that the merged CVS/Aetna would not need CVS/Caremark to function
as intermediary, thus benefiting consumers by eliminating intermediaries’ markup (Frakt 2017).
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Table 1: Sales Percentage to Consumers by Manufacturer, Retailer, and Product.
Panel A: Sales to Consumers by Manufacturer and Retailer (as percentage of total sales in the sample)
Manufacturer Total
Seller m1 m2 m3 m4
VSC Retailers
rv4 1.06 2.34 0.63 2.34 6.36
rv5 0.54 1.24 0.66 0.96 3.41
rv6 3.31 5.35 1.26 5.32 15.25
rv7 1.43 4.61 1.68 13.53 21.25
rv8 0.18 1.36 0.37 – 1.91
rv9 6.97 23.86 5.86 0.30 37.00
DSC Retailers
rd1 1.51 – – – 1.51
rd2 – 8.79 – – 8.79
rd3 – – 4.52 – 4.52
Total 15.01 47.56 14.98 22.45 100.00
Panel B: Sales to Consumers by Manufacturer, Retailer, and Display Type (as percentage of total sales in the sample)
Seller 2 m
2 panel Senior Other Total 3 Total 4
m1 m2 m3 m4 m1 m2 m3 m4 m1 m2 m3 m4
VSC Retailers
rv4 1.06 0.94 0.24 – – 1.40 0.10 – – – 0.29 2.34 6.36
85.18
rv5 0.54 1.10 0.28 – – 0.14 0.22 0.17 – – 0.16 0.79 3.41
rv6 3.31 3.20 0.97 1.39 – 2.15 0.19 – – – 0.10 3.93 15.25
rv7 1.43 3.42 0.68 0.28 – 1.06 0.45 – – 0.13 0.55 13.25 21.25
rv8 0.18 0.22 – – – 1.10 0.16 – – 0.04 0.21 – 1.91
rv9 6.93 17.55 3.79 0.10 0.03 5.82 0.53 0.15 0.01 0.49 1.55 0.06 37.01
DSC Retailers
rd1 1.51 – – – – – – – – – – – 1.51
14.83rd2 – 5.10 – – – 3.49 – – – 0.21 – – 8.80
rd3 – – 1.61 – – – 0.21 – – – 2.70 – 4.52
Total 1 14.97 31.54 7.56 1.77 0.03 15.17 1.86 0.32 0.01 0.87 5.56 20.36 100
Total 2 55.84 17.37 26.80 100
Notes: Each cell in Panels A and B corresponds to the percentage of sales to consumers (relative to the total sales’ volume to consumers sold in year 2013 in the whole sample) by the
corresponding combination of: (1) Manufacturer and Seller in Panel A and; (2) Manufacturer, Seller, and Display Format in Panel B. Thus, in each panel, all the numbers sum to 100
(excluding the rows and columns labeled as “Total”). A cell displays the symbol “–” when no sales are observed for such combination. In Panel B there are a total of 57 cells with positive sales
(i.e without the symbol “–’), that corresponds to the 57 inside products (see footnote 24 for details). In panel B, “Total 1” refers to the total sum by manufacturer mi, i = 1, . . . , 4; “Total 2”
refers to the total by display format (2 m2 panel, Senior, and Other); “Total 3” refers to the total sum by retailer rvj , j = 4, . . . , 9 and r
d
j , j = 1, 2, 3; “Total 4” refers to the total by VSC
Retailers (i.e. sum over rvj , j = 1, . . . , 6) and by DSC Retailers (i.e. sum over r
d
j , j = 1, 2, 3). “DSC” stands for Direct Sales Channel. “VSC” stands for Vertical Sales Channel. See figure 1 for
definitions of prices and vertical relations in the industry.
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Table 2: Wholesale and Retail Prices in the VSC.
Panel A: All Manufacturers and All VSC Retailers
Display Format Wholesale Price VSC Price (Retail Price)
Median Mean SD Min Max Median Mean SD Min Max
2 m2 panel 8.40 12.18 12.93 0.81 93.38 9.11 13.28 14.13 0.86 99.39
Senior 12.84 17.11 18.35 0.81 158.06 13.50 18.14 19.59 0.83 165.80
Other 24.62 28.61 26.02 0.34 148.60 26.91 31.70 29.46 0.37 171.99
Panel B: By Manufacturer and All VSC Retailers
Display Manu- Wholesale Price VSC Price (Retail Price)
Format facturer Median Mean SD Min Max Median Mean SD Min Max
2 m2 panel
m1 8.29 9.41 7.25 1.42 51.64 8.92 10.62 8.15 1.50 56.18
m2 10.79 12.64 10.73 2.33 64.80 11.46 13.78 12.54 2.41 83.22
m3 6.17 8.57 11.66 1.04 79.45 6.78 9.32 12.65 1.09 81.52
m4 12.38 19.80 18.88 0.81 93.38 13.29 21.10 20.22 0.86 99.39
Senior
m1 16.09 15.17 4.45 9.07 24.13 16.78 15.90 4.54 9.46 25.17
m2 6.32 10.82 14.12 0.81 98.39 6.51 11.17 14.49 0.83 100.57
m3 8.80 21.73 28.76 2.09 158.06 9.46 23.86 30.98 2.17 165.80
m4 18.71 21.07 10.25 6.11 46.45 19.40 22.03 10.85 6.49 53.85
Other
m1 48.69 42.41 24.94 3.61 83.26 52.58 48.05 29.76 5.09 106.60
m2 34.31 36.73 18.19 0.34 117.09 36.97 38.83 18.99 0.37 120.03
m3 13.71 28.60 33.88 0.45 148.60 15.35 32.66 39.28 0.64 171.99
m4 13.48 15.44 14.73 0.38 57.28 14.44 17.59 16.88 0.41 66.93
Notes: Panel A reports summary statistics of wholesale and VSC prices (i.e. retail prices) for each display format (2 m2
panel, Senior, and Other) across manufacturers (m1, m2, m3, and m4) and VSC retailers (rv4 , r
v
5 , . . . , r
v
9 ), respectively. Panel
B reports summary statistics of wholesale and VSC prices across all VSC retailers for each combination of display format and
manufacturer. See table A1 for a comparison of summary statistics of wholesale and VSC prices by manufacturer and by VSC
retailer for the display format 2 m2 panel. Similar tables for the other display formats (seniors and others) are available upon
request. “DSC” stands for Direct Sales Channel. “VSC” stands for Vertical Sales Channel. See figure 1 for definitions of prices
and vertical relations in the industry.
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Table 3: Price Paid by Consumers to in the DSC and VSC.
Panel A: By Display Format, All Manufacturers
Display Sale’s Median Mean SD Min Max
Format Channel
2 m2 panel DSC 10.05 11.97 10.82 1.67 66.90VSC 9.11 13.28 14.13 0.86 99.39
Senior DSC 13.69 14.55 6.67 6.30 40.44VSC 13.50 18.14 19.59 0.83 165.80
Other DSC 5.85 14.74 16.65 1.36 63.62VSC 26.91 31.70 29.46 0.37 171.99
Panel B: By Display Format and by Manufacturer
Display Manu- Sale’s Median Mean SD Min Max
Format facturer Channel
2 m2 panel
m1
DSC 11.84 12.73 2.91 9.38 19.04
VSC 8.92 10.62 8.15 1.50 56.18
m2
DSC 13.65 16.85 17.37 1.67 66.90
VSC 11.46 13.78 12.54 2.41 83.22
m3
DSC 6.88 6.83 2.20 2.67 10.16
VSC 6.78 9.32 12.65 1.09 81.52
Senior
m1
DSC 13.97 14.19 2.67 11.65 19.04
VSC 16.78 15.90 4.54 9.46 25.17
m2
DSC 14.85 14.60 4.10 7.87 21.31
VSC 6.51 11.17 14.49 0.83 100.57
m3
DSC 9.97 14.67 9.25 6.30 40.44
VSC 9.46 23.86 30.98 2.17 165.80
Other
m2
DSC 18.50 24.04 21.04 1.36 63.62
VSC 36.97 38.83 18.99 0.37 120.03
m3
DSC 5.46 6.78 3.22 3.81 14.33
VSC 15.35 32.66 39.28 0.64 171.99
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of the price paid by consumers on sales made in the DSC and in the VSC (column labeled “Sale’s
Channel”). Panel A reports the summary statistics by display format (2 m2 panel, Senior, and Other). DSC prices refer to the prices over all sales
from manufacturers to consumers in that display format. VSC prices refer to the prices over all sales from retailers that are not manufacturers for
that display format. Panel B reports the summary statistics by display format and by manufacturer. DSC prices in Panel B refer to the manufacturer
in each cell (i.e. there is only one manufacturer in each of these cells). VSC prices refer to the prices over all sales from retailers that are not
manufacturers for the display format and manufacturer in the relevant cell. Manufacturer m4, that corresponds to the additional manufacturer
that aggregates smaller manufacturers, is not included because it does not perform any sale to the consumers directly (i.e. manufacturer m4 does
not participate in the DSC). Similarly manufacturer m1 is not included for the display format “Other” because it does not perform any sale to
the consumers directly. “DSC” stands for Direct Sales Channel. “VSC” stands for Vertical Sales Channel. See figure 1 for definitions of prices and
vertical relations in the industry. 43
Table 4: Quantity Discounts in the VSC, but not in the DSC.
Price paid by consumers per m2 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(m2) -7.0708*** -1.8348 -6.9948*** -1.5502
(0.4472) (1.2105) (0.4511) (1.1810)
Log(m2) × VSC -6.0297*** -6.2510***
(1.2990) (1.2576)
Manufacturers Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Retailers Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Display Formats Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Months Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.4081 0.4291 0.4493 0.4723
Number of Observations 570 570 570 570
Notes: All regressions are OLS specifications. The sample is the same sample used for the structural esti-
mation, and it corresponds to all purchases of all display formats made by the consumers in the industry.
The dependent variable is the price paid by consumers per square meter of advertising in a given month,
labeled as “Price paid by consumers per m2.” The variable “Log(m2)” corresponds to the total square meters
of advertising purchased by consumers in that month on a logarithmic scale. The variable “VSC” is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the consumer performed the purchase through a VSC retailer, and 0 if the consumer
performed the purchase through the DSC retailer. “DSC” stands for Direct Sales Channel. “VSC” stands for
Vertical Sales Channel. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
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Table 5: Demand Estimates.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error
Price:
- Mean (α) -0.050 (0.001) -0.164 (0.003) -0.066 (0.001) -0.114 (0.002)
- St. dev. (Σ) 0.076 (3.2e-05) 0.029 (0.006) 0.055 (0.004)
Firm dummy variables:
- Manufacturer 1 -0.672 (0.117) -0.420 (0.200) -0.175 (0.086) -0.271 (0.136)
- Manufacturer 2 0.930 (0.102) 0.958 (0.170) 0.405 (0.074) 0.629 (0.116)
- Manufacturer 3 -0.382 (0.095) -0.484 (0.163) -0.195 (0.071) -0.334 (0.111)
- Retailer 1 0.193 (0.257) 0.570 (0.442) -0.615 (0.191) 0.151 (0.301)
- Retailer 2 -0.659 (0.117) -0.757 (0.197) -0.323 (0.085) -0.066 (0.134)
- Retailer 3 -0.909 (0.107) -0.597 (0.182) -0.268 (0.079) 0.310 (0.124)
- Retailer 4 2.728 (0.119) 0.188 (0.270) -0.747 (0.117) -0.314 (0.184)
- Retailer 5 -0.424 (0.113) -0.797 (0.187) -0.326 (0.081) -0.092 (0.127)
- Retailer 6 0.242 (0.160) 0.161 (0.274) -0.822 (0.118) -0.159 (0.186)
- Retailer 7 -0.505 (0.108) -0.487 (0.180) -0.203 (0.078) -0.426 (0.122)
- Retailer 8 -1.867 (0.118) -1.511 (0.205) -0.604 (0.089) -0.556 (0.139)
Product dummy variables:
- 2 m2 panel 0.911 (0.084) 0.408 (0.142) 0.179 (0.061) 0.281 (0.097)
- Senior -0.652 (0.086) -0.683 (0.146) -0.268 (0.063) -0.424 (0.099)
Channel specific preferences:
- Nesting parameter (λ) 0.492 (0.002) 0.354 (0.018)
Search parameters:
- Search cost (S¯) 0.100 (0.042)
- Scale of ε˜ (σε˜) 0.072 (0.016)
Model specification:
- OLS Yes No No No
- GMM No Yes Yes Yes
- Random coefficients for price No Yes Yes Yes
- Channel specific preferences No No Yes Yes
- Search No No No Yes
- Google search micro moments No No No Yes
Value of GMM Objective: – 24.047 5.368 31.056
Number of observations: 570 570 570 570
Notes: Estimates of selected parameters from the structural demand model. All specifications include dummy variables for manufacturers, retailers, display format, and months fixed effects. The model with search uses
the following information structure for F˜pt(p): consumers know two distributions of prices, the distribution of prices for the DSC retailers, and the distribution of prices for the VSC retailers (see footnote 24 for details).
See subsection 2.2 for details about the data used in the estimation. A description of the demand model is in subsection 4.1. Details about the estimation procedure are in subsection 3.1. See subsection 5.1 for details
about the specifications of the models in the different panels. The Google search micro moment is implemented using the equation in D.5; see appendix D for details. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Table 6: Supply Estimates.
Estimate
Panel A: Marginal costs estimates
Manufacturers:
- Constant (γ0) 0.383
- 2 m2 panel 0.431
- Senior 0.122
- Manufacturer 1 0.604
- Manufacturer 2 0.512
- Manufacturer 3 0.063
Retailers:
- Constant 0
Panel B: Distribution of manufacturers’ marginal costs
Mean 0.872
St. dev. 0.355
Min. 0.383
Median 0.877
Max. 1.418
Panel C: Bargaining weight estimates (mean)
Bargaining weight retailers (ν¯rmj) 0.794
Bargaining weight manufacturers (1-ν¯rmj) 0.206
δ¯Srmj 0.260
Notes: Estimates of selected parameters from the structural supply model. The supply estimates use the
estimated demand model 4 from table 5. A description of the supply model is in subsection 3.2. Details about
the estimation procedure for the supply model are in subsection 4.2. See subsection 5.2 for details about the
estimates. The estimates in panel C refer to the mean (across retailers, manufacturers, and products) of the
variables as defined in subsections 3.2 and 5.2, and are denoted with upper bars.
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Table 7: Counterfactual Results.
Variable Baseline
No consulting No search No purchase No intermediaries’
services services aggregation services services
(1) (2) (3) (4) = (1) + (2) + (3)
Inside share (%) 69.53 68.67 66.80 63.29 60.81
DSC as fraction of inside (%) 18.68 19.86 18.72 26.54 27.88
Mean price posted (Euros per m2) 8.97 9.19 8.99 12.56 12.83
Mean price paid (Euros per m2) 9.47 9.37 9.52 11.78 11.73
Number of retailers searched 6.19 6.25 5.89 6.15 5.93
Change in consumer surplus (Euros per m2) – -1.03 -7.55 -1.75 -10.29
Notes: Counterfactual results using model 4 from table 5 and the supply estimates from table 6. The row labeled “Inside share” reports the fraction of the total
potential size of the market that resulted in purchases of the inside products. The row labeled “DSC as fraction of inside” reports the fraction of those purchases
of the inside products made through the Direct Sales Channel (DSC). The row labeled “Mean price posted” reports the mean price posted for the inside products.
The row labeled “Mean price paid” reports the mean price paid by the consumers (i.e. mean price weighted by the quantity purchased). The row labeled “Number
of retailers searched” reports the mean number of retailers searched by the consumers (both in the DSC and VSC). The last row labeled “Change in consumer
surplus” reports the change in the total consumer surplus of each column, relative to the Baseline, computed using the weighted sum across types of consumers of
the compensating variation using the equation in 20. The column labeled “Baseline” report the previous measures for the baseline model 5 from table 5. Columns 1
to 4 reports the previous measures for each of the counterfactual scenarios defined in subsection 6.2. In column (4) the change in consumer surplus is computed by
simulating simultaneously the counterfactuals in columns (1), (2), and (3), which is not equivalent as the sum of the change in consumer surplus in these columns.
See section 6 for details.
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Figure 1: The Portuguese Outdoor Advertising Industry.
Notes: The figure displays the vertical relations in the Portuguese outdoor advertising industry. “DSC” stands for Direct Sales
Channel. “VSC” stands for Vertical Sales Channel. The manufacturers (m1, . . . ,m4) sell their products to the VSC retailers
(rv4 , . . . , r
v
9 ) charging wholesale prices. The VSC retailers sell to consumers, charging VSC prices (or retail prices). The three
main manufacturers (m1,m2,m3) also sell directly to the consumers through the DSC; this is captured in the diagram by the
DSC retailers (rd1 , r
d
2 , r
d
3), which correspond to the large manufacturers charging a DSC prices to the consumers.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Coefficient of Variation.
Density Estimate
Empirical CDF
Notes: The figure displays the kernel density estimate (top panel) and empirical cumulative distribution (bottom panel) of coefficient of variation
of prices (CV) for sales to consumers in the VSC and DSC, conditional on quantity discounts. To perform the estimation we proceed in three
steps. First, we define the unit of analysis as a tuple (Display Format,Month,Volume Percentile), where “Display Format” are the display formats
as defined in subsection 2.1, “Month” are the months of the year, and “Volume Percentile” are the percentiles in the volume variable (to account
for quantity discounts). Second, for each unit of analysis (i.e. tuple as defined above) we compute the CV (i.e. the variation of prices is within
tuple). Third, we estimate the kernel density and empirical cumulative distribution as follows. Let cv denote realized CV in each tuple j ∈
{1, . . . , J}. We estimate the probability density function for sales made to consumers through retailers and manufacturers, f (cv), as: fˆK (cv;h) =
1
J h
∑J
j=1K
(
cv−cv(j)
h
)
, where K (z) is a standard univariate gaussian kernel function, h is the bandwidth that we choose by cross validation,
and cv(j) , j = 1, . . . , J are the CV in each tuple. Given that the price distribution has its domain bounded we use a renormalization method to
deal with the boundaries when estimating the probability density function of CV. We estimate the empirical cumulative distribution of CV, F (cv),
as: FˆJ (cv) = 1J
∑J
j=1 1 {cv(j) ≤ cv}, where 1 {A} is the indicator function of the event A. “DSC” stands for Direct Sales Channel. “VSC” stands
for Vertical Sales Channel. See figure 1 for definitions of prices and vertical relations in the industry.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Procedures to Collect and Clean the Main Data
Data was collected directly from the VSC retailers and manufacturers. The information
collected from the VSC retailers includes, for each product and for each month of the year
2013: (i) the sales values, (ii) the quantity sold in number of advertising faces andm2, (iii) the
cost of the products transacted, (iv) the commissions, fees, and quantity discounts received
and paid.
Retailer data is complemented with information for direct sales of manufacturers (i.e.,
sales of manufacturers to consumers) and sales of manufacturers to VSC retailers other
than the 5 main VSC retailers. This information was obtained from a survey to the 3 main
manufacturers, J.C. Decaux, Cemusa, and Mop, and includes the same information previously
described for the VSC retailers.
We exclude observations: (i) with a ratio of median absolute deviation (MAD) of m2 sold
(in logs) to the standard deviation larger than 3 (11 observations dropped),67 (ii) with a ratio
of MAD of wholesale price (in logs) to the standard deviation larger than 3 (12 observations
dropped), (iii) with a ratio of MAD of retail price (in logs) to standard deviation larger than
3 (6 observations dropped), (iv) for panels sold in airpots (9 observations dropped).68 We
further aggregate all monthly sales through groups that are not the ones that we surveyed
in a single product (54 observations collapsed).
A.2 Google Search Data
We use Google search data to generate micro moments used to identify the search parameters
on the demand side. The Google search data were obtained directly from Google Trends
Portugal from the link below, and accessed on August 30, 2017:
https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=2013-01-01%202013-12-31&geo=PT
The raw Google search data corresponds to weekly searches, for the period under study, in
Google Portugal (https://www.google.pt/) of the names of the retailers spelled as follows:
cemusa, havas, ipg, jcdecaux, mop, omnicom, pmg, and wpp. These retailers correspond,
respectively, to the following retailers in the data: Cemusa, Havas, Megameios, JCDecaux,
Mop, Opusopera, Powermedia, and Group M. For robustness, we performed the search in
Google Portugal for each of these retailers with the names spelled as above and in all cases,
the first result displayed by Google Portugal was the webpage of the retailer.
We use these raw data to generate the variables defined next. For the micro moments in
the estimation of section 5, we use the mean weekly searches for the previous 3 months.
67The median and standard deviation are always specific to each display format.
68Panels at airports are typically negotiated on a case-by-case basis, and are substantially more expensive.
Modeling panels at airports is beyond our scope this paper.
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Google Search Variables Definitions
- Mean weekly searches previous month. Mean per month of weakly searches using the previous month.
- Mean weekly searches previous 3 months. Mean per month of weakly searches using the mean over
previous 3 months.
- Mean weekly searches previous 6 months. Mean per month of weakly searches using the mean over
previous 6 months.
- Mean weekly searches moving average. Mean per month of weakly searches using a three period
moving average.
- Total searches previous month. Total searches per month using the previous month.
- Total searches previous 3 months. Total searches per month using the mean of the previous 3 months.
- Total searches previous 6 months. Total searches per month using the mean of the previous 6 months.
- Total searches moving average. Total searches per month using a three period moving average.
The idea behind the variables using moving averages is to capture an adaptive expectation of what the
searches will be based on information on these lags. That is, they are a proxy for what could consumers
forecast for the current visibility of a retailer based on the past values, using the fixed weighting scheme
determined by the moving average.
B Additional Description of the Industry and the Data
B.1 Market Concentration
The Portuguese outdoor advertising market is quite concentrated both at the manufacture
and retail levels. At the manufacture level there are three large national firms, m1, m2, and
m3, that are responsible of 77.6 percent of the sales in the market (Panel A in table 1). The
other small local manufacturers are responsible of the reminder of the sales. Manufacturerm2
is the largest manufacturer with 47.6 percent of the sales. At the retail level the five largest
VSC retailers, i.e. retailers rv4 , . . . , rv8 , are responsible of 48.2 percent of the sales. Retailer rv7
is the largest retailer with 21.2 percent of the sales, and also larger than the DSC retailers.
The most popular display format are 2 m2 panels, that encompass 55.8 percent of the sales
(Panel B in table 1). The largest manufacturer, m2, is responsible of 56.5 percent (31.5/55.8)
of the sales of 2 m2 panels in the market. The largest VSC retailer, rv7 , is responsible
of 10.4 percent ((1.4+3.4+0.7+0.3)/55.8) of the sales of 2 m2 panels in the market. There is no
cross-ownership between manufacturers, nor between retailers, nor between manufacturers
and retailers.
B.2 Seasonalities and Monthly Variation
Market Shares and Quantities. The top panel in figure A1 shows monthly seasonal
variations in total volume and substantial variation the market shares within month. The
top panel shows the total volume sold each month (right vertical axis) distinguishing the
sales to consumers in the VSC and DSC. The total volume purchased in the Portuguese ad-
vertising industry increases during the summer. Total volume varies substantially by month,
reflecting the monthly variation in the purchases made in the VSC. The figure also shows
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the distribution of products’ market shares (left vertical axis) for each month distinguishing
sales to consumers in the VSC and DSC. There is large variation in market shares both in
the VSC and DSC.
Seasonal variations in the Portuguese advertising industry have two main components.
First, a deterministic component, whereby the demand for advertising increases during cer-
tain months of the year (e.g. summer vacation). Second, a non deterministic component,
whereby individual firms make specific advertising decisions on certain months of the year
based on their needs (e.g. firms launching a new product in September, or advertising in
December before Christmas, etc.). The deterministic component explains the increase in
advertising during the summer. The non deterministic component explains the monthly
volatility.
Prices. The bottom panel in figure A1 shows that the within monthly variation in prices is
larger than the variation across months. The bottom panel displays the distribution of prices
paid by consumers each month distinguishing sales to consumers in the VSC and DSC. The
distribution of prices of sales made in the VSC is more disperse than the one in the DSC.
This is due to the presence of quantity discounts on the sales made in the VSC that are not
present in the DSC (table 4). Conditional on quantity discounts, the distribution of prices
of sales made in the VSC is less disperse as discussed in the paper.
C Random Coefficient Nested Logit Model with Search
In this appendix we compute the choice probabilities, maximum expected value, and welfare
for the nested logit random coefficient model with search. To facilitate the reading we repeat
the notation of the model in subsection C.1.
C.1 Notation review
The indirect utility of consumer i for inside product j in market t, conditional on the set of
retailers searched, Ri, is:
Uijt|Ri = −αipjt + xjtβ + τDd + τDm + τDr + τDt + ξjt + εˆijt,
i = 1, . . . , It, j ∈ JˆtRi = {jˆ : jˆ ∈ Jt is sold by retailer r ∈ Ri} ∪ {0}, t = 1, . . . , T,
where Ri denotes the subset of retailers searched; JˆtRi is the consideration set of consumer
i, given by the subset of products sold by all the retailers searched and the outside product;
pjt is the price of product j in market t; xjt is a S-dimensional (row) vector of observable
characteristics of product j in market t; τDd , τDm , τDr , and τDt capture the preferences for display
format d, manufacturer m, retailer r, and monthly seasonal effects in market t, using fixed
dummy variables for display format, manufacturer, retailer, and monthly seasonal effects,
respectively; ξjt is the valuation of unobserved (by the econometrician) characteristics of
product j in market t; εˆijt = ζigt + (1− λ)εijt, is a stochastic term; g ∈ {0, 1, 2} define three
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groups (or nests) of nonoverlapping products for the outside product (denoted g = 0 with only
one product), the products sold by the DSC retailers (denoted g = 1), and the products sold
by the VSC retailers (denoted g = 2); ζigt has a unique distribution such that εˆijt is extreme
value; λ is a nesting parameter such that 0 ≤ λ < 1; αi = α + Σνi, νi ∼ Pν(νi) = N (0, 1),
are individual-specific parameters that capture consumers’ preferences for price; and β is a
S-dimensional vector of parameters. In each market t, we normalize the characteristics of
the outside product, j = 0, such that p0kt = x0t = τD0 = τD0 = τD0 = τDt = ξ0t = 0 for all t.
Denote by U ijt ≡ −αipjt +xqˆtβ+ τDd + τDm + τDr + τDt + ξjt, and by δjt ≡ −αpjt +xjtβ+ τDd +
τDm + τ
D
r + τ
D
t + ξjt. Note that U ijt = δjt − Σνipjt.
C.2 Maximum expected value
Following McFadden (1978),69 the expected maximum utility conditional on the set of retail-
ers Ri searched is:70
E
[
max
j∈Jˆt
(
U ijt + εˆijt
)]
= log
2∑
g˜=0
∑
j˜∈g˜
(
eU ij˜t
)1/1−λ1−λ + γˆ,
where E(·) is the expectation operator taken over εˆijt; log(·) denotes the natural logarithm
function; and γˆ = 0.5772 is the Euler’s constant.
Denote by IgˆRi the inclusive value of the set of products from the searched retailers that
belong to subset gˆ excluding the outside product:
IgˆRi ≡ (1− λ) log
∑
j∈(gˆ∩JˆtRi\{0})
eU ijt/(1−λ), gˆ ∈ {1, 2}. (C.1)
Then:
E
[
max
j∈Jˆt
(
U ijt + εˆijt
)]
= log
2∑
g˜=0
[∑
j∈g˜
(
eU ijt
)1/1−λ]1−λ
+ γˆ,
= log
2∑
g˜=0
[
e
log
(∑
j∈g˜ e
Uijt/1−λ
)]1−λ
+ γˆ,
= log
2∑
g˜=0
eIg˜Ri + γˆ,
= log
(
1 +
2∑
gˆ=1
eIgˆRi
)
+ γˆ, (C.2)
where the last equality follows because the inclusive value of the outside product is equal to
69Corollary to theorem 1 on pages 82-3, equations (14) and (17).
70For the case of the logit model, where εijt is a standardized type I extreme value, this expression specializes
to E
[
maxj∈Jˆt
(
U ijt + εijt
)]
= log
∑
j∈Jˆi e
Uijt , a well known result.
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zero.
Then the expected net value for consumer i of searching a subset of retailers Ri in market
t is:
VtRi =
∫
max
j∈Jˆi
Uijt dFεˆ(εˆ) dFp(p)− SCRi + ε˜itRi =∫
log
(
1 +
2∑
gˆ=1
eIgˆRi
)
dFp(p) + γˆ − SCRi + ε˜itRi ,
where SCRi is the cost of searching the subset of retailers Ri; ε˜itRi is a random shock to the
subset of searched retailers that is drawn i.i.d. from a type I extreme value distribution with
location parameter µε˜ = 0 and scale parameter σε˜ > 0; and the last equality follows from the
expression in equation (C.2) with the inclusive value, IgˆRi , defined by the equation in (C.1).
C.3 Choice probabilities
The probability that consumer i chooses product jˆ in group gˆ conditional on the searched
retailers, Ri, denoted by Pijˆt|Ri , is given by:
Pijˆt|Ri =
exp
(
Uijˆt
(1−λ)
)[∑
j˜∈g exp
(
Uij˜t
1−λ
)]−λ
∑2
g˜=0
[∑
j˜∈g˜ exp
(
Uij˜t
1−λ
)]1−λ , (C.3a)
=
exp
(
Uijˆt
1−λ
)
exp
{
log
[∑
jˆ∈gˆ exp
(
Uijˆt
(1−λ)
)]} × exp
{
log
[∑
jˆ∈gˆ exp
(
Uijˆt
(1−λ)
)]1−λ}
exp
{
log
[∑2
gˆ=0 exp
(
log
{∑
j˜∈g˜ exp
[
Uij˜t
(1−λ)
]}1−λ)]} ,
=
exp
(
Uijˆt
1−λ
)
exp
{
log
[∑
jˆ∈gˆ exp
(
Uijˆt
(1−λ)
)]} × exp
{
(1− λ) log
[∑
jˆ∈gˆ exp
(
Uijˆt
(1−λ)
)]}
exp
{
log
[∑2
gˆ=0 exp
(
(1− λ) log
{∑
j˜∈g˜ exp
[
Uij˜t
(1−λ)
]})]} ,
=
exp
(
Uijˆt
1−λ
)
exp
(
IigˆRi
1−λ
) × exp(IigˆRi)
exp(IgˆRi)
, (C.3b)
= Pigˆt|Ri × Pijˆt|gˆRi , (C.3c)
i = 1, . . . , It, jˆ ∈ (g ∩ JˆtRi), g ∈ {0, 1, 2}, t = 1, . . . , T,
where:
IigˆRi ≡ (1− λ)E
[
max
j∈(gˆ∩JˆtRi )
Uijt|Ri
]
,
= (1− λ) log
∑
j∈(gˆ∩JˆtRi )
e
Uijt/(1−λ), (C.4a)
IgˆRi ≡ log
(
1 +
2∑
g=1
eIigˆRi
)
, (C.4b)
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and where the first equality in (C.3a) follows from the nested logit choice probability (e.g.
McFadden 1978, equation 18); the equality in (C.3b) follows from replacing the definitions of
the inclusive values, IigˆRi and IgˆRi , given by equations in (C.4a) and (C.4b), respectively;71
and where Pigˆt|Ri is the marginal conditional probability of choosing a product in group gˆ given
that the product is in the consideration set JˆtRi , and Pijˆt|gˆRi is the conditional probability of
choosing product jˆ given that the product is in group gˆ and in the consideration set JˆtRi .
C.4 Welfare Measures
The expected consumer surplus, in Euros, for consumer i is given by:
E(CSi) =
1
αi
E
{
max
R′i∈Λ
[
max
j∈Jˆi
(
U ijt + εˆijt
)− SCRi + ε˜itRi]} ,
=
1
αi
∫
ε˜ijt
{
max
R′i∈Λ
[∫
εˆijt
(
max
j∈Jˆi
{
U ijt + εˆijt
}
dFεˆitRi (εˆitRi)
)
− SCRi + ε˜itRi
]}
dFε˜itRi (ε˜itRi),
=
1
αi
∫
ε˜ijt
{
max
R′i∈Λ
[
log
(
1 +
2∑
gˆ=1
eIgˆRi
)
− SCRi + ε˜itRi
]}
dFε˜itRi (ε˜itRi) + C1,
=
1
αi
σε˜ log
∑
R′i∈Λ
exp
1
σε˜
[
log
(
1 +
2∑
gˆ=1
eIgˆRi
)
− SCRi
]+ C2, (C.5)
where the expectation in the first line is taken over both random shocks, εˆijt and ε˜ijRi ; the
third equality follows by computing the maximum expected utility over the shocks εˆijt using
the expression in equation (C.2) with the inclusive value, IgˆRi , defined by the equation in
(C.1); the fourth equality follows by computing the maximum expected utility over the shocks
ε˜itRi (e.g. Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985, p. 105) with σε˜ being the scale parameter of these
shocks; and C1 and C2 are constants.
D Identification of Search Costs
Identification of search costs parameters relies on the following: (i) the search costs specifica-
tion in our setting;72 (ii) exogenous variation of product availability across markets (periods)
within retailers in the VSC, with full support conditional on the other variables; and (iii)
availability of search data with information about ratios of subset of searched retailers, as
defined below. We proceed in four steps. First, we present the search costs specification.
Second, we discuss identification, conditional on (i), (ii), and (iii). Third, we discuss condi-
tions under which the Google search data can be used to construct (iii). Finally, we discuss
the validity of (i), (ii), and (iii) in our empirical setting.73
71As before, E(·) is the expectation operator taken over the i.i.d. shocks within group gˆ; the equation in
(C.4a) follows from the maximum expected value of the logit model (i.e. within group gˆ) (see, e.g., footnote
70); and the equation in (C.4b) follows because the inclusive value of the outside product is equal to zero.
72See Honka (2014) for a similar approach.
73See also the discussions in De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and Wildenbeest (2012) and Moraga-González,
Sándor, and Wildenbeest (2015), and footnote 56.
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D.1 Search cost specification
The main restriction is that consumers search for retailers, but pay a search cost for each
manufacturer sold by the retailer. We use the following specification: SCRt = S¯×{#mr1t}+
· · · + S¯ × {#mrQt}, where Rt = {r1t, . . . , rQt} is the subset of searched retailers, rqt with
q = 1, . . . , Q, each of the searched retailers in t, S¯ is a parameter, and {#mrqt} denotes the
number of different manufacturer for which rqt has product availability in market t. Note
that, conditional on selling products in t, {#mrqt} = 1 for DSC retailers, and {#mrqt} ≥ 1
for VSC retailers.
D.2 Identification
Consider a consumer type who bought a given product j ∈ (gˆ∩ Jˆt˜ \{0}) in periods t˜ ∈ {t, t′}.
Denote by Rt˜ the subset of retailers searched by this consumer in t˜ ∈ {t, t′}, and by rˆ the
retailer who sold product j. Choose t such that Rt = {rˆ} is singleton, and that retailer rˆ
has only availability of products from a single manufacturer. This is always possible due to
(i) and observability of products available in a given market.74 Note that Rt = {rˆ} does not
imply that the consideration set, Jˆt˜, is singleton, because rˆ may sell multiple products from
the same manufacturer. Similarly, choose t′ such that product j ∈ (gˆ ∩ Jˆt˜ \ {0}) is available,
Rt = {rˆ} is singleton, and that retailer rˆ has availability of products from two manufacturers.
Then, using the equation in (7):
log
(
PRt
PRt′
)
=
V Rt − V Rt′
σε˜
,
=
SCtRt − SCt′Rt′
σε˜
, (D.1a)
= − S¯
σε˜
, (D.1b)
where (D.1a) follows from
∫
log
(
1 +
∑2
gˆ=1 e
IgˆRti
)
dF˜pt(p) =
∫
log
(
1 +
∑2
gˆ=1 e
IgˆR
t′i
)
dF˜pt′(p), due
to argmaxj∈JˆtUijt|Rti = argmaxj∈Jˆt′Uijt′|Rt′i ; and (D.1b) follows by using the search costs spec-
ification in subsection D.1. As discussed in subsection D.4, the key restriction for the last step
is that consumers search for VSC retailers (who sell products from multiple manufacturers),
but pay search cost for each manufacturer.
Similarly, by choosing t′′ such that product j ∈ (gˆ ∩ Jˆt′′ \ {0}) is available, Rt′′ = {rˆ} is
singleton, and that retailer rˆ has availability of products from three manufacturers:
log
(
PRt
PRt′′
)
= −2S¯
σε˜
. (D.2)
Using (iii), the left hand side in the equations in (D.1) and (D.2) is observed. Thus, these
74For example, using exogenous variation of product availability, pick t such that only the products of
retailer rˆ are available and rˆ has only products from the manufacturer of j.
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equations jointly identify the search costs parameters, S¯ and σ˜.
D.3 Using Google search data to construct ratios of searched retail-
ers
We now describe the assumptions under which we can use the Google search data in the left
hand side in equations (D.1) and (D.2). For the analysis in this subsection, denote with a
hat “ ̂” variables that are not function of parameters of the model (i.e. data). Let Ĝrt be
number of google searches for retailer r in market (period) t; M̂rt be the number of consumers
who searched for retailer r in t; M̂t be the size (or total number of consumers) of the market;
and P̂rt ≡ M̂rt/M̂t ∈ (0, 1) be the share of consumers who searched for retailer r in t. We are
interested in P̂rt. The problem is that we observe Ĝrt, not M̂rt. We now provide conditions
under which Ĝrt can be used as proxy for M̂rt, to compute P̂rt.
Assume that the total number google searches, Ĝrt, and the number of consumers who
searched for retailer r, M̂rt, are related as follows:75
Ĝrt = κM̂rt + Ξrt, (D.3)
where κ is a scalar; and Ξrt denote mean zero random variables that are i.i.d. across r and t.
Denote by Prt, without hat, the prediction of the model for the share of consumers who
searched for retailer r in t. This variable is calculated from the model, and is a function of
the parameters. Define the set of consumers who searched for retailer r in t as:
Art = {(ζigt, εijt, νi, ε˜itRt) : r ∈ Rit},
where Rit is the set of retailers searched by consumer i in t; and ζigt, εijt, νi, and ε˜itRt are
defined in appendix C.1. Then:
Prt =
∫
Art
dP (ζigt, εijt, νi, ε˜itRt).
where P (·) denotes the population distribution function.
Then, for any retailers r and k with Pkt > 0:
p-lim
t→∞
(
Ĝrt
Ĝkt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Observed in the data
=
(
Prt
Pkt
)
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prediction of the model
(D.4)
Finally, note that Rt˜, with t˜ ∈ {t, t′, t′′}, is singleton in subsection D.3. Thus, PRt˜ = Prt˜
and the Google search data in (D.4) can be replaced in the left hand side in equations (D.1)
and (D.2).
75See next subsection for a discussion of this specification in our setting.
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Empirical Implementation. For the estimation with Google search micro moments, we
add one additional moment condition defined as follows. First, for each retailer r = 1, . . . , R
we compute the difference between the ratio of probabilities across consecutive months pre-
dicted by the model, and the Google search measure observed in the data, Prt(θ)Pr,t+1(θ) − ĜrtĜr,t+1 ,
where Prt(θ) is the model’s prediction of the share of consumers who searched for retailer r
in t, and Ĝrt is the number of searches for retailer r in t from the Google data. Next, we
define by Pt(θ) the (R × 1) row-vector with such differences, one for each retailer. Finally,
we define the micro moment as:
m(θ∗) ≡ E [Pt(θ∗)′Pt(θ∗)] = 0.
For the estimation, we use its empirical analogue:
mˆ(θ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Pt(θ)′Pt(θ). (D.5)
We add the moment condition in (D.5) to the GMM objective in (13), and use the inverse
of the sample variance of the empirical moments as the weighting matrix.
D.4 Validity of the assumptions in our empirical setting
First, we discuss (i), the search cost specification. The key restriction is that consumers search
for VSC retailers, but pay search costs for the product of each manufacturer sold by the VSC
retailer. We interpret it as the consumers interacting with the different managers (within the
VSC retailer) responsible for the display formats of different manufacturers. If a consumer
wants to collect information about the prices of the display formats of the manufacturers
carried by the retailer, the consumer needs to contact the various managers associated to
this process.
Second, we discuss (ii). This hypothesis is necessary for identification. It is non testable.
We believe it is reasonable in our empirical setting because we observe substantial empirical
variation, across markets (months), in the number of products available within retailers in the
VSC. This is because, in our setting, a given manufacturer sells display formats to multiple
VSC retailers and to consumers.
Finally, we discuss the validity of our specification for the Google search data in (iii)
(equation D.3). There are two main assumptions in the equation in (D.3). First, that Ξrt are
i.i.d. across retailers and markets (periods). This assumption would be violated if a signifi-
cant number of consumers would search more for Ĝ1t than Ĝ2t because, for example, the name
of retailer r1 coincides (or is similar) to other search query unrelated to r1. This effect would
confound the Google search for retailer r1, with the unrelated search query. For example, in
an English speaking country, Google searches for the retailer “Mop” may be confounded with
Google searches for the article for cleaning floors. For Google searches in Portugal during the
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period under analysis, we did not find any confounding searches for any of the names of the
retailers. In addition, we find that, for all retailers and manufacturers, the first result dis-
played by Google Portugal was the webpage of the corresponding retailer/manufacturer, after
performing a search query in Google Portugal with the name of the retailer/manufacturer
used to construct the variable (see subsection A.2 for details about the names of retailers).
Consumers who performed such searches in Google Portugal are predominantly searching for
information about the retailers. We interpret this as evidence that these confounding factors
do not play a major role in our setting. Second, that the scalar κ is the same across retailers.
This assumption would be violated if, for example, consumers would search for retailer r1
distinctively more online than for retailer r2, relative to non-online searches (e.g. Yellow
pages searches). Discussion with industry members suggest that there are no substantial dif-
ferences across retailers in online searches by consumers. Finally, Google searches are a good
proxy for searches in our setting, because our data include all meaningful transactions in the
industry and consumers search for these retailers/manufacturers predominantly online. For
these reasons, we believe that the specification in equation (D.3) is sensible in our empirical
setting.
E Details about the Supply
Estimation of the bargaining weights.
In this section we compute the equations that we use for the estimation in the supply side.
We derive the first order necessary conditions from the bargaining problem and transform
them into an expression that we use to recover the bargaining weights.
Next equation repeats the objective problem to facilitate the reading:
Nrmj ≡
[∑
k∈Ωr
(p∗k − ωk − ρk)Msk(P(ω))− ΠDistr,−j
]νrmj [∑
k∈Ωw
(ωk − µk)Msk(P(ω))− ΠDistm,−j
]1−νrmj
,
≡ [ΠDistr (ω∗)− ΠDistr,−j]νrmj [Πm(ω∗)− Πm,−j]1−νrmj . (E.1)
The first order necessary conditions for ωj from the equation in (E.1) are:
νrmj
[
ΠDistr (ω
∗)− ΠDistr,−j
]νrmj−1 [Πm(ω∗)− Πm,−j]1−νrmj ∂ΠDistrj (ω∗)∂ωj +
(1− νrmj)
[
ΠDistr (ω
∗)− ΠDistr,−j
]νrmj [Πm(ω∗)− Πm,−j]−νrmj ∂Πmj(ω∗)∂ωj = 0. (E.2)
From the envelope theorem ∂Πm(ω
∗)
∂ωj
= −∂ΠDistm (ω∗)
∂ωj
= Msj(P(ω)), which means that the
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equation in (E.2) simplifies to:
νrmj
[
ΠDistr (ω
∗)− ΠDistr,−j
]νrmj−1 [Πm(ω∗)− Πm,−j]1−νrmj −
(1− νrmj)
[
ΠDistr (ω
∗)− ΠDistr,−j
]νrmj [Πm(ω∗)− Πm,−j]−νrmj = 0. (E.3)
Simplifying the equation in (E.3):
νrmj
[
Πm(ω
∗)− Πm,−j
]1−νrmj − (1− νrmj) [ΠDistr (ω∗)− ΠDistr,−j] [Πm(ω∗)− Πm,−j]−νrmj = 0,
νrmj
[
Πm(ω
∗)− Πm,−j
]− (1− νrmj) [ΠDistr (ω∗)− ΠDistr,−j] = 0,[
Πm(ω
∗)− Πm,−j
]− (1− νrmj)
νrmj
[
ΠDistr (ω
∗)− ΠDistr,−j
]
= 0,[
Πm(ω
∗)− Πm,−j
]− δSrmj [ΠDistr (ω∗)− ΠDistr,−j] = 0,
(E.4)
where δSrmj ≡ (1−νrmj)νrmj ∈ (0, 1).
Now look at the components in the equation in (E.4), namely, the difference between the
profits with agreement and disagreement:
Πm(ω
∗)− Πm,−j =
∑
k∈Ωm
(p∗k − ωk − ρk)Msk(P(ω))−
∑
k∈Ωm\j
(p∗k − ωk − ρk)Ms−jk (P(ω)),
=
(
p∗j − ωj − ρj
)
Msj(P(ω))−
∑
k∈Ωm\j
(p∗k − ωk − ρk)M
[
s−jk (P(ω))− sk(P(ω))
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆s−jk
,
=
(
p∗j − ωj − ρj
)
Msj(P(ω))−
∑
k∈Ωm\j
(p∗k − ωk − ρk)M∆s−jk . (E.5)
where ∆s−jk ≡ s−jk (P(ω)) − sk(P(ω)) denotes the difference between the market share of
product k if product j is offered and if it is not. Note that this expression corresponds to
equation (9) in Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas (2010, p. 62) that in our case does not
has closed-form solution. It corresponds to the proportion of the market share of product j
that is allocated to the other products carried by the retailer or manufacturer. Similarly, for
the difference in retail profits, an expression analogue to the one in (E.5) is obtained.
Next replace the expression in (E.5) and its analogue for the the difference in retail profits
into (E.4), and divide by M to obtain:(p∗j − ωj − ρj) sj − ∑
k∈Ωm\j
(p∗k − ωk − ρk) ∆s−jk

− δSrmj
(p∗j − ωj − ρj) sj − ∑
k∈Ωr\j
(p∗k − ωk − ρk) ∆s−jk
 = 0. (E.6)
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Denote that matrix of shares and changes in shares by:
s ≡

s1 −∆s−12 · · · −∆s−1J
−∆s−21 s2 · · · −∆s−2J
...
... . . .
...
−∆s_J1 −∆s−J2 · · · sJ
 . (E.7)
Finally rewrite the equation in (E.6) in matrix form using (E.7):
(
ΛM  s) (ω∗ − µ)− δS (ΛR  s) (p∗ − ω∗ − ρ) = 0,
µ = ω∗ − δS (ΛM  s)−1 (ΛR  s) (p∗ − ω∗ − ρ) . (E.8)
We use the expression in (E.8) for the estimation in the supply side.
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F Additional Tables and Figures
Table A1: Wholesale and Retail Prices in the VSC: By Manufacturer and by VSC Retailer,
Display Format: 2 m2 panel.
Manu- VSC Wholesale Price VSC Price (Retail Price)
facturer Retailer Median Mean SD Min Max Median Mean SD Min Max
m1
rv4 8.01 7.75 1.02 5.68 9.41 8.40 8.30 1.11 6.11 10.27
rv5 9.84 9.29 2.77 3.36 13.97 11.13 11.06 2.35 7.42 15.40
rv6 2.94 3.72 1.89 1.42 7.25 3.20 4.01 2.05 1.50 8.19
rv7 5.92 6.00 1.31 3.51 8.29 6.20 6.27 1.35 3.64 8.61
rv8 10.50 11.58 2.92 8.10 16.27 11.54 12.94 3.46 8.94 19.42
rv9 12.68 18.29 13.08 5.55 51.64 19.11 21.36 13.89 7.38 56.18
m2
rv4 11.95 11.60 2.71 6.92 16.23 12.28 11.97 2.77 7.31 16.70
rv5 11.62 12.70 5.58 5.76 29.02 11.94 13.42 5.51 7.02 29.92
rv6 5.10 5.59 2.76 2.33 11.34 5.28 5.77 2.82 2.41 11.62
rv7 8.64 9.64 4.17 4.79 20.64 9.01 10.02 4.27 4.94 21.19
rv8 9.54 17.05 17.52 3.79 55.53 10.59 18.34 18.77 3.92 60.76
rv9 14.21 19.99 16.30 8.19 64.80 16.96 23.92 20.32 10.97 83.22
m3
rv4 7.07 7.50 1.14 6.47 9.93 7.28 7.71 1.15 6.79 10.28
rv5 6.07 7.99 5.44 4.20 22.56 7.32 8.92 5.65 4.88 24.28
rv6 3.42 3.78 2.30 1.04 8.79 3.58 4.02 2.41 1.09 9.34
rv7 6.29 14.64 22.20 2.96 79.45 6.49 15.14 22.74 3.17 81.52
rv8 4.51 5.28 2.24 3.57 11.16 4.94 5.72 2.29 4.05 11.63
rv9 6.97 12.86 15.85 5.24 51.92 9.44 15.63 19.78 5.49 64.36
m4
rv4 11.48 21.56 20.72 5.29 61.70 11.60 22.35 21.71 5.34 61.65
rv5 40.44 34.72 14.47 18.48 56.84 43.47 37.48 16.88 18.92 64.88
rv6 3.42 3.17 1.68 0.81 6.04 3.52 3.27 1.72 0.86 6.20
rv7 11.42 12.41 3.32 7.43 18.40 11.98 13.29 3.75 7.94 19.94
rv9 30.91 31.17 23.52 9.94 93.38 33.10 33.42 24.67 11.91 99.39
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of wholesale and VSC prices (i.e. retail prices) in the VSC for
the display format 2 m2 panel for each combination of manufacturer (m1, m2, m3, and m4) and VSC retailer
(rv4 , rv5 , . . . , rv9) across months of the year. (Note that this table corresponds to table 2, Panel B, sub-panel
2 m2 panel, desegregated by retailer that is not manufacturer.) Similar tables for the other display formats
(seniors and others) are available upon request. “DSC” stands for Direct Sales Channel. “VSC” stands for
Vertical Sales Channel. See figure 1 for definitions of prices and vertical relations in the industry.
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Table A2: Robustness: Demand Estimates.
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error
Price:
- Mean (α) -0.114 (0.002) -0.110 (0.002)
- St. dev. (Σ) 0.055 (0.004) 0.052 (0.005)
Firm dummy variables:
- Manufacturer 1 -0.271 (0.136) -0.267 (0.137)
- Manufacturer 2 0.629 (0.116) 0.648 (0.117)
- Manufacturer 3 -0.334 (0.111) -0.314 (0.112)
- Retailer 1 0.151 (0.301) 0.213 (0.303)
- Retailer 2 -0.066 (0.134) -0.127 (0.135)
- Retailer 3 0.310 (0.124) 0.221 (0.125)
- Retailer 4 -0.314 (0.184) -0.356 (0.185)
- Retailer 5 -0.092 (0.127) -0.215 (0.128)
- Retailer 6 -0.159 (0.186) -0.131 (0.188)
- Retailer 7 -0.426 (0.122) -0.352 (0.123)
- Retailer 8 -0.556 (0.139) -0.570 (0.141)
Product dummy variables:
- 2 m2 panel 0.281 (0.097) 0.269 (0.098)
- Senior -0.424 (0.099) -0.447 (0.100)
Channel specific preferences:
- Nesting parameter (λ) 0.354 (0.018) 0.341 (0.015)
Search parameters:
- Search cost (S¯) 0.100 (0.042) 0.063 (0.020)
- Scale of ε˜ (σε˜) 0.072 (0.016) 0.048 (0.007)
Model specification:
- OLS No No
- GMM Yes Yes
- Random coefficients for price Yes Yes
- Channel specific preferences Yes Yes
- Search Yes Yes
- Google search micro moments Yes Yes
- Price information structure Two distributions: prices in VSC and DSC One distribution with all prices
Value of GMM Objective: 31.056 31.385
Number of observations: 570 570
Notes: Estimates of selected parameters from the structural demand model. All specifications include dummy variables for manufacturers, retailers, display format, and months fixed effects.
Model 1 is the same as model 4 in table 5, and is presented to facilitate the reading. Information structure for F˜pt(p) in model 1: consumers know two distributions of prices, the distribution of
prices for the DSC retailers, and the distribution of prices for the VSC retailers. Information structure for F˜pt(p) in model 2: consumers only know one distribution with the prices for all the
products in the market (see footnote 24 for details). See subsection 2.2 for details about the data used in the estimation. A description of the demand model is in subsection 4.1. Details about
the estimation procedure are in subsection 3.1. The Google search micro moment is implemented using the equation in D.5; see appendix D for details. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Figure A1: Market Shares, Total Volume, and Prices by Month.
Market Shares and Total Volume
Prices
Notes: The top panel displays the distribution of market shares and total volume by month. The left vertical axis shows the
distribution of market shares each month, distinguishing the sales to consumers in the VSC and DSC. The right vertical axis
shows the total sales’ volume from each month (horizontal series) distinguishing the sales to consumers in the VSC and DSC.
The bottom panel displays the distribution of prices (per square meter) each month, distinguishing the sales to consumers in
the VSC and DSC. Each vertical box displays the 95th percentile (upper whisker), 75th percentile (upper hinge), median (black
circle marker), 25th percentile (lower hinge), and 5th percentile (lower whisker). The maximum market share by month are as
follows (the first number refers to the sales on the VSC and the second number refers to the sales in the DSC): January (0.188,
0.029); February: (0.028, 0.061); March:(0.218, 0.052); April: (0.024, 0.020); May: (0.142, 0.050); June: (0.032, 0.037); July:
(0.164, 0.037); August: (0.016, 0.034); September: (0.139, 0.033); October: (0.066, 0.077); November: (0.139, 0.035); December:
(0.038, 0.047). “DSC” stands for Direct Sales Channel. “VSC” stands for Vertical Sales Channel. See figure 1 for definitions of
prices and vertical relations in the industry.
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Figure A2: Distribution of Coefficient of Variation.
Density Estimate
Empirical CDF
Notes: The figure displays the kernel density estimate (top panel) and empirical cumulative distribution (bottom panel) of coefficient of variation
of prices (CV) for sales made to consumers through retailers and manufacturers, conditional on quantity discounts. To perform the estimation
we proceed in three steps. First, we define the unit of analysis as a tuple (Display Format,Manufacturer,Retailer,Volume Percentile), where
“Display format” are the display formats as defined in subsection 2.1, “Manufacturer” are the manufacturers of the product (M1, . . . ,M4), “Retailer”
are the VSC retailers (rv4 , . . . , r
v
9 ) and DSC retailers (r
d
1 , r
d
2 , r
d
3 ), and “Volume Percentile” are the percentiles in the volume variable (to account
for quantity discounts). Second, for each unit of analysis (i.e. tuple as defined above) we compute the CV (i.e. the variation of prices is within
tuple). Third, we estimate the kernel density and empirical cumulative distribution as follows. Let cv denote realized CV in each tuple j ∈
{1, . . . , J}. We estimate the probability density function for sales made to consumers through retailers and manufacturers, f (cv), as: fˆK (cv;h) =
1
J h
∑J
j=1K
(
cv−cv(j)
h
)
, where K (z) is a standard univariate gaussian kernel function, h is the bandwidth that we choose by cross validation,
and cv(j) , j = 1, . . . , J are the CV in each tuple. Given that the price distribution has its domain bounded we use a renormalization method to
deal with the boundaries when estimating the probability density function of CV. We estimate the empirical cumulative distribution of CV, F (cv),
as: FˆJ (cv) = 1J
∑J
j=1 1 {cv(j) ≤ cv}, where 1 {A} is the indicator function of the event A. “DSC” stands for Direct Sales Channel. “VSC” stands
for Vertical Sales Channel. See figure 1 for definitions of prices and vertical relations in the industry.
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